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1. Introduction 
Mortality rates and fertility rates are declining in most industrialized countries leading to a 
significant change in the age structure of populations. Different economic issues such as fiscal 
policy or the consequences of population aging on pension systems have been studied 
extensively by economists using models of overlapping generations of households (OLG-
Models). For many applications OLG models offer an attractive framework. The set-up of 
overlapping generations implies the presence of different generations of economic agents at 
every point in time which makes OLG models especially useful to study questions of 
intergenerational transfers. As Ludwig (2002) argues OLG models are very suitable for 
analysing issues of fiscal policy since here the costs and benefits of different generations can 
be well presented. In this context OLG-models have been used to study issues of Ricardian 
Debt Neutrality, i.e. the question, whether fiscal policy tends to redistribute between 
generations or not (see for example Buiter (1988)). In an OLG model the economy always 
consists of heterogeneous agents – for example young and old households in the basic two 
period model. This set-up is able to reflect the fact that people of different ages will not 
necessarily act economically the same way. This concerns for example consumption 
behaviour and thus saving decisions, which can plausibly differ between younger and older 
people, reflecting the fact that the younger tend to save for their retirement and the older to 
dissave what they have been saving for consumption during their retirement. So OLG models 
are able to take into account changes in the propensity to consume - or more generally, 
changing behaviour - as people grow older.  
OLG models have been used to study very different topics. These range from issues 
concerning social security systems to very specific issues like the future development of 
Carbon Emissions (compare Dalton et al. 2005). Thus, the field of research is broad and in 
some of these studies the development of age-composition of the population plays a 
fundamental role. Introducing realistic demography to the framework of research can thus be 
very fruitful.  
Starting with a simple two-period model, economists have made many extensions of the basic 
OLG model, extending it for example from two to three and N life periods or different 
mortality patterns. Extending the model from the basic two-period model to further periods 
has the advantage, that the more periods there are in the model, the better life-cycle aspects 
are represented. Life-cycle models with many generations can take account of detailed 
differences in wealth, marginal propensity to consume and in labour supply and earnings of 
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different agents. But as Blanchard points out OLG models with more than two generations 
tend to be analytically intractable. This is due to the fact that generations at different stages of 
their life-cycle have systematically different propensities to consume and different levels of 
wealth, making aggregation difficult or even impossible (Blanchard (1989), page 115). But, 
concerning quantitative empirical work, a two period framework is not very realistic. 
Interpreted in real life time one time-period would cover about 30 years. In other words one 
period represents the whole working lifetime of an individual. Assuming that for example 
consumption behaviour does not change throughout the whole working life is certainly not 
very realistic. So, in order to depict realistic lifecycles, for empirical applications, numerically 
solved models which contain a large number of generations and detailed patterns of life-cycle 
earnings, savings and consumption must be relied on1.  
 
Many OLG models are based on a framework that is very restrictive or even based on 
unrealistic assumptions concerning demographic aspects. When it comes to empirical 
applications, ignoring demographic aspects can lead to significantly different results and as a 
consequence to false or imprecise conclusions (compare Bommier and Lee, page 138). Li and 
Tuljapurkar (2004) for example find in their simulations significant and dramatically different 
implications of aging on diverse economic variables when including an age-dependent death 
rate into their framework. 
 
As an example for a very restrictive demographic set-up one can take a look at the basic two 
period OLG version as studied by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). These OLG 
models take the population growth rate as exogenous. Mortality is ignored and simply set to 
zero until the end of a predefined length of life which is the same for all households. In this 
narrow environment there is no place for proper demographic analysis, especially concerning 
the decline in mortality and fertility. And as long as there are such restrictive assumptions 
made upon mortality and other demographic variables investigated the effects of inherent 
changes in these and so the economic consequences of an aging society can not be studied 
using OLG models. For example, since the time of death is a predefined point in time in 
simple OLG models there is no uncertainty concerning an individual’s length of life. But it is 
this uncertainty of the time of death that is an important aspect for social security systems. 
                                                 
1 Grafenhofer, Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2006); page 1 
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Blanchard (1989) for example includes a form of insurance company to his framework in 
order to take into account the impact of uncertainty of lifetime on individual’s behaviour.  
2. Motivation and Outline  
This section gives an outline of my thesis. First I present a short review on the literature 
concerning realistic demography in OLG models. This review on the literature serves as a 
motivation for the topic of my thesis and describes demographic aspects of diverse 
frameworks. A more detailed outline of my thesis concludes this section.  
2.1 A short literature review 
The standard OLG model as pioneered by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) is a simple 
two period model in which all economic agents live for exactly two periods and die at the end 
of the second. From a lifecycle point of view the first life period represents working life while 
the second represents retirement. Since in this simple approach death is fixed to a certain 
point in time, there is no individual lifetime uncertainty. Thus, having perfect foresight, agents 
know exactly how much to save for consumption during their retirement. And as they can not 
die unexpectedly bequests are not made, since it is assumed that agents do not consider their 
heirs and parents. In order to be able to represent life-cycle aspects in greater detail some 
effort has been put into extending the model to a greater number of periods (Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987)). This is necessary in order to take altering behaviour at different stages of 
life into account. As Bommier and Lee (2001; page 137) point out, two periods are the 
minimum to encompass the fact that not all economic agents are the same. But a two period 
model, they argue, fails to represent the most basic feature of the human economic life cycle, 
namely that life not only ends but also begins with a period of dependency.  
 
An initial step towards more realistic demography is Blanchard’s (1989) continuous Model of 
Perpetual Youth which simply assumes an age-independent constant mortality rate. As there 
is a permanent risk of death economic agents face uncertainty concerning their lifespan. Since 
mortality is assumed to be constant and consequently age-independent everyone has the same 
life expectancy2, regardless of her/his actual age. In other words, age doesn’t alter the lifetime 
horizon and so, in some way, people have perpetual youth.  
Facing the same probability to die implies that the propensity to consume is the same for all 
households. As acknowledged by Blanchard, this approach is unable to capture the life-cycle 
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aspect of life, which is the essence of overlapping generation models3. The great advantage of 
Blanchard’s model is its simple empirical application, which is the reason why it has become 
a widely used tool of quantitative analysis4. Its main drawback however is the absence of life-
cycle detail concerning earnings, consumption and saving as well as its rigid assumption of an 
age-independent mortality rate. Concerning earnings for example Blanchard defines labour 
income to be less for older cohorts than for younger ones in order to be able to capture the 
effect of retirement on income. His way of defining the distribution of labour income between 
generations also implies that individual labour income decreases throughout the entire life 
time (if aggregate labour income is assumed to be constant through time). This certainly does 
not reflect realsitic income profiles. 
 
Gertler (1999) extends Blanchard’s framework distinguishing between workers and retirees. 
He assumes that workers do not face mortality but stochastically move into retirement. Once 
retired, they are confronted, as in Blanchard’s model, with a constant risk of death. 
Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2003) examine the consequences of demographic change on 
diverse pension reform scenarios for Austria using Gertler’s approach. They also assume that 
mortality occurs only when households enter their second and final life stage. Again retirees 
face a constant and so a quasi age-independent probability of death. In their work Gertler’s 
model is extended by endogenizing labour supply. This extension is made in order to analyse 
the effects on the labour market resulting from population ageing. The transition from 
workers to retirees is modelled in a similar way as is mortality in the Perpetual Youth Model. 
Workers face a constant risk of being retired and thus face uncertainty concerning their future 
status in the life cycle while retired people face a permanent risk of death.  
 
In addition to these age-independent approaches other authors model age-dependency of 
mortality. Bommier and Lee (2001) use a general mortality function which is able to capture 
the age of specific agents and so make allowance for different probabilities of death for 
people of different age groups. To represent the uncertainty of time of death they use a 
smooth survival function which they do not restrict to any specific form and thus develop a 
very general framework. They show that many results known from simpler models can be 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 This approach of modelling mortality implies an exponential distribution of  the “probability of death” and the 
memorylessness of  the exponential distribution implies constant expectation. 
3 Bommier, Lee page 136 
4 Grafenhofer et. al; page 2 
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extended to their more realistic framework. The motivation to develop such a model with 
realistic demography, they point out, is to avoid false conclusions in empirical applications.  
 
Li and Tuljapurkar (2004) use a probability distribution of the age at death to achieve a more 
realistic representation of mortality. Alongside changes in the life expectancy, they argue, 
decreasing uncertainty in the timing of death is a very important aspect of demographic aging. 
Concerning individual decision making agents are not only confronted with an increase in 
their life expectancy but also with decreasing uncertainty of their lifespan. Indeed the 
relationship between increasing life expectancy and decreasing variance of age at death is 
almost linear5. Working directly with the distribution of death age, they argue, enriches the 
framework by allowing for a more realistic analysis.  
As they demonstrate, declining mortality in the 20th century has lead to a tightening of the 
distribution of the age at death in all industrialized countries which can also be seen as a 
decrease in the variance of death age. This second aspect of aging can be taken into account 
by using a distribution function of age at death. And as Li and Tuljapurkar show, using an 
age-dependent death rate has dramatically different implications for the effect of aging on 
consumption, interest rate, wages and wealth, while their framework still remains analytically 
tractable.  
 
Grafenhofer, Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2006) develop an alternative age pattern. 
The core principle is an alternative way of thinking of “age”. Instead of defining age as “time 
since birth” they model only a few stages of age, where age itself captures diverse attributes 
such as earning potentials and taste which characterise a persons stage in his/her life-cycle. 
Agents move stochastically from one stage to the next, but not necessarily every period. Thus, 
not all agents age at the same speed. Some remain longer in a certain stage, while others move 
faster from one stage to the next. These few different stages of age, they argue, capture 
empirically realistic life-cycle differences. Since aging of people occurs stochastically, the 
framework is labelled “Probabilistic Aging” Model. It generalizes Gertler’s (1999) model of 
workers and retirees to more age groups and allows for mortality already in younger age 
groups. Concerning demographic realism, this is an improvement since in Gertler’s model 
workers – or more generally speaking, younger age groups – do not face any risk of death. 
                                                 
5 See Li and Tuljapurkar (2004) page 4.  
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Additionally, since there are eight age groups modelled, the PA-model can take heterogeneity 
among workers and retirees into account, again enriching their framework’s realism.   
 
Hock and Weil (2006) pay particular interest to the influence of fertility on the population age 
structure. Changes in fertility change the population age structure and this again affects 
economic outcomes. But not only reduced fertility changes the population age structure but 
also the population age structure affects fertility. This interdependence is due to the 
dependency burden working-age people face. Built on three very simple equations, giving the 
laws of motion of three age-groups they study the interaction of fertility, population age 
structure and economic outcomes. 
Reduced fertility leads in the short run to a “demographic dividend” meaning an unusually 
high ratio of potential workers to dependants – children and retirees. But in the long run - 
Hock and Weil argue - the increased old age dependency resulting from reduced fertility can 
prevail and more than recoup gains from reduced fertility. Workers can thus be confronted 
with an increase in dependants although the number of children they have to take care of is 
lower than before. Using the Probabilistic Aging Model, Hock and Weil study this dynamic 
interaction of fertility, age structure and economic consequences. 
2.2 Outline of my thesis  
As the overview on the literature shows, one main aspect of introducing more realistic 
demography to OLG models concerns different approaches of modelling mortality and 
ageing. Therefore the focus of my thesis is on different approaches to model mortality. In 
particular it concentrates on three different frameworks dealing with alternative perceptions of 
mortality. The following table gives an overview of these different mortality approaches and 
the outline of my thesis. 
 
 
 9
 
  mortality approach 
  age-independent  age-dependent  Probabilistic Aging
Section 3 4 5,6 
Diamond: basic OLG 
model without life time 
uncertainty 
Li, Tuljapurkar: age-
dependency of mortality 
by introduction of age at 
death distribution function 
Grafenhofer et. al: 
new definition of 
ageing and 
distinguishing real 
time from human 
age-characteristics  
Blanchard: introduction of 
a constant mortality rate 
generates individual life 
time uncertainty   
Hock and Weil: 
feedback of 
population age 
structure on fertility 
papers 
discussed 
Gertler: further 
heterogeneity by 
distinguishing between 
workers and retirees      
Table 2.1: outline of the thesis 
The third section presents and analyzes alternative frameworks, dealing with age-independent 
mortality approaches covering the basic two period model of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond 
(1965), Blanchard’s Model of Perpetual Youth (1989) and Gertler’s (1999) extension of 
Blanchard’s model to a model of retirees and workers.  
The fourth section of the thesis makes a step closer to demographic realism by moving from 
age-independent to an age-dependent mortality framework. It deals with Li and Tuljapurkar’s 
(2004) paper of an age-dependent mortality framework paying particular attention to the 
effect of decreasing uncertainty in the time of death, which comes along with increasing life 
expectancy.  
The fifth section is dedicated to Grafenhofer’s model of Probabilistic Aging (2006) which, by 
allowing for heterogeneous aging of different agents introduces a high degree of diversity 
among an economy’s population and thus achieves a high level of diversity concerning 
individual’s life cycles.  
Finally Hock and Weil’s (2006) analysis of the interaction of fertility, age structure and 
economic dependency will be presented in section 6, which is based on a simplified version of 
the Probabilistic Aging model.  
Section 7 draws some conclusions. 
 
The argument for considering these particular papers is that their analysis shows very well the 
necessity of paying attention to proper demographic representation in OLG models. These 
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papers are of high relevance as they show the practicability and power of OLG models in 
analysing issues of intergenerational dependency or simply the impact of mortality and 
fertility changes on an economy. What shall be achieved is to underline the importance of 
demographic realism within economic analysis. 
 
To summarize, this thesis presents and compares different approaches of achieving more 
realism in OLG models concerning demographics and life cycle details. The aim is to view 
these models under a demographic perspective and to analyze their quality in reflecting 
human life cycle details. 
Thereby the main focus is on the implementation of different mortality and fertility 
assumptions to the models’ framework and how these different assumptions affect 
individuals’ behaviour. Another important aspect will be the resulting implications of 
changing individuals’ behaviour on the economy as a whole.  
 11
3. Age-independent mortality 
The following section presents age-independent mortality approaches, starting with the basic 
two period model of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). This basic approach simplifies 
mortality patterns by assuming perfect survivorship for all agents from the first stage of life to 
the second – and final – life period. Despite its very simple framework the model is able to 
reflect different consumption behaviour of workers and retirees. But of course it lacks realism 
concerning important demographic aspects, assuming perfect survivorship and thus absence 
of uncertainty in agent’s life expectation. 
The second model gives a more complex framework of modelling mortality. In Blanchard’s 
Model of Perpetual Youth (1989) agents face a constant and thus age-independent risk of 
death. The main drawback of this model is that the constant mortality assumption yields also 
age-independent consumption behaviour. It therefore fails to reflect a very important aspect of 
the life-cycle, namely the changing propensities to consume that one would expect to occur as 
agents grow older. 
Finally Gertler’s model of retirees and workers combines both approaches, by adopting and 
extending Blanchard’s mortality framework of constant risk of death. His extension of the 
model to two stages of life, one working life stage and a second representing retirement is 
able to capture the fact of different consumption behaviour of retirees and workers, as well as 
allowing for lifetime uncertainty among agents. Thus, concerning demographic realism, it 
makes good progress by combining the advantages of the two previously mentioned models.  
3.1 The basic two period Model (Diamond)    
In the Diamond model6 the economy consists of two generations at any point in time, a young 
cohort of workers and an old cohort of retirees. Every period a new cohort is born and the 
former young generation moves into retirement. Consequently the former retirees die as they 
move out of retirement. Young people work to finance their consumption during the first life 
stage and to save for retirement. Retirees simply consume as much as they can afford from the 
savings they made during their youth and the interest earned on savings, as there is no 
altruistic behaviour assumed. Concerning the transition from workers to retirees and retirees 
to death, there is no uncertainty assumed. So workers in period t move with probability one 
from their working stage to retirement in t+1. Death occurs after the retirement period also 
with probability one. Thus there is no individual lifetime uncertainty.  
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The model’s framework yields a population structure always consisting of two different types 
of agents. At every point in time a new generation of workers is born and at the same time 
former workers move into retirement. Thus, the economy consists of two different generations 
overlapping each other due to their transition through the life cycle. This is the core feature of 
overlapping generation models. 
3.1.1 Structure of the model 
 
Individuals 
Individuals born at time t split their labour income wt between consumption in period t, c1t= 
(1-st) wt, and savings for retirement stwt in period t+1. Second period consumption c2t+1 is 
financed by the savings and the interest earned on savings, c2,t+1= (1+rt+1)stwt. An individual 
seeks to maximize his/her utility arising from consumption in both periods. The individual’s 
utility function is given by 
( )( )θρρ
ρρ
+−+−=
−
+
−
111
1
12
1
1 tt
t
cc
u           (3.1) 
where ρ measures the household’s willingness to shift consumption between the two periods 
and θ measures individual’s time preference. A small ρ implies that marginal utility falls 
slowly as consumption rises and thus agents are more willing to shift consumption between 
the two periods. The value 1/ρ gives the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The smaller 
ρ, the greater the intertemporal substitution. The budget constraint follows as  
tt
t
t wcr
c =++ ++ 1211 1
1 .         (3.2)  
Solving the individual’s maximization problem7 yields an optimal savings rate as  
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ρρρ
ρρ
θ /)1(/1
/)1(
)1()1(
1)( −
−
+++
+=
r
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Proposition 3.1: 
When the interest rate in the Diamond economy increases agents will increase their savings as 
long as their intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/ρ) is greater than one and decrease their 
savings otherwise. Under the assumption of logarithmic utility the savings rate is independent 
of the prevailing interest rate. 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The model is presented following David Romer (1996). For comparability to other models presented in this 
thesis the notation is changed. In contrast to Romer technological progress is set to zero for simplicity.  
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Proof: see Appendix A.  
 
Proposition 3.1 states that the relationship between the interest rate and agent’s savings rate 
depend on the parameter ρ. Whether the savings rate increases with the interest rate or not 
depends on the strength of two opposing effects. Intuitively an increase in the interest rate has 
an income effect as well as a substitution effect. As the interest rate rises second period 
consumption becomes more attractive compared to first period consumption since the price 
for second period consumption decreases. Individuals therefore have an incentive to shift 
consumption from the first to the second period – this is the substitution effect. Opposing this 
effect, the higher interest rate also increases available income in both periods. The higher 
interest rate makes it possible to save less in the first period without reducing second period’s 
consumption, this is the income effect. Intuitively it depends on the individual’s willingness to 
shift consumption between the two periods which of these two effects dominates. A high 
value of ρ (ρ>1) indicates that individuals are not willing to shift consumption very much and 
so the income effect will dominate, while a low value of ρ (ρ<1) implies the dominance of the 
substitution effect8. If the utility function is assumed to be logarithmic the value of ρ is equal 
to one. Then the two effects balance and the interest rate does not affect saving decisions.   
 
Firms 
Firms have two factors of production - capital and labour – and produce output according to Yt 
= F(Kt,Lt). The production function is assumed to fulfil the Inada-conditions9 and to have 
constant returns to scale. As the economy is assumed to be competitive, capital and labour 
earn their marginal products. This implies the interest rate to be r=f´(k) and wage w=f(k)-
kf´(k), both expressed in units of labour (see Appendix A.2 at the end of the section for 
calculation). 
3.1.2 Dynamics of the economy 
Aggregate capital in period t+1 is the amount saved by the young cohort in period t. Thus, 
Kt+1=s(rt+1)Ltwt, where Lt gives the number of individuals born at time t. Population grows at 
the exogenous rate n, thus Lt+1=(1+n)Lt. Expressed in units of labour – i.e. dividing by the 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 The calculation of s is presented in Appendix A.1 at the end of section 3. 
8This follows from the derivation of the savings rate with respect to r.   
9 Inada Conditions state that ( ) ∞=′→ kfk 0lim and ( ) 0lim =′∞→ kfk  (see Romer, page 9). 
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size of the labour force in t+1 Lt+1 yields ttt wrsn
k )(
1
1
11 ++ += . Considering the fact that 
capital and labour are paid their marginal products, capital accumulation follows  
[ ])´()())´((
1
1
11 ttttt kfkkfkfsn
k −+= ++ .        (3.4) 
This equation implicitly defines kt+1 as a function of kt. As soon as kt takes a value such that 
kt+1=kt, the capital stock has reached its steady state. But as the right hand side of the equation 
also depends on kt+1, the question if there is any unique value of k* can not be answered easily 
for the general case. In the special case of logarithmic utility and with Cobb-Douglas 
production function the dynamic equation of capital accumulation takes the form10 
ααθ tt knk )1()2)(1(
1
1 −++=+ . 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: dynamic behaviour of k (Romer, page 77)  
 
The Figure plots kt+1 as a function of kt. The 45° line represents all points where kt+1 equals kt, 
thus all points possibly being an equilibrium. Setting kt=0 implies kt+1 also being equal to 
zero. For small values of kt the capital accumulation function lies above the 45°-degree line 
but crosses it eventually at the point k* and stays below afterwards. Starting at point k0 the 
capital stock converges to the point k*, regardless of where the initial k0 is set. Thus, in this 
special case, k* is the unique, and globally stable, equilibrium value of the capital stock k.  
In the general case the capital accumulation equation can yield different outcomes. For 
example there could be multiple values of k* as in Figure 3.2a or the economy’s capital stock 
could converge to zero, regardless of its initial value as in 3.2b. Figure 3.2c shows a case 
                                                 
10 Logarithmic utility implies ρ equal to one which yields a savings rate r=1/(2+θ). The assumption of CD 
production function yields F(K,L)=KαL1-α . In units of labour f(k)=kα. Inserting this into (3.4) finally yields this 
expression. 
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where, depending on the initial value of capital, the economy converges to zero or to a strictly 
positive value of k. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2: possible relationships between kt and kt+1 in the general case (Romer, page 80) 
3.1.3 Lifecycle aspects of the Diamond model 
In the Diamond model agents do not face any uncertainty concerning their length of life or 
their earning status. Thus they have perfect foresight and simply choose an optimal rate of 
saving in order to maximize their utility arising from consumption.  
Of course the model’s assumptions on the population’s dynamics do not reflect realistic 
behaviour. But although the framework is very simple and restrictive concerning 
demographics, the Diamond model yields an important aspect of the human economic life 
cycle. As agents have two different stages of life, the model takes into account heterogeneity 
among individuals within the economy and allows for changing consumption behaviour as 
individuals change from one stage of life to another, i.e. “grow older”. It thus reflects different 
behaviour among individuals living in the economy at the same time, as workers and retirees 
have different propensities to consume. But, as Bommier and Lee point out, this two-period 
framework fails to reflect a very important aspect of human life cycle, namely, that it also 
begins with a period of economic dependency (compare Bommier and Lee, page 136).  
The assumption of two life periods has another disadvantage. As Hock and Weil remark, 
interpreted in real lifetime, both periods cover a length of 20 to 30 years (Hock and Weil, 
page4). Therefore, the model does not allow for detailed analysis within the two stages of life 
– work and retirement. Assuming unchanging behaviour of individuals throughout their whole 
working life or retirement does not seem very suitable to reflect human behaviour. Extending 
the framework to more stages of life would therefore allow for more detail in life cycle 
analysis. 
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3.2 A Model of Perpetual Youth (Blanchard)  
The previous section showed that mortality patterns are modelled very simple in the Diamond 
model. One first improvement concerning the framework’s realism is Blanchard’s Perpetual 
Youth Model. Here life time uncertainty is introduced by the assumption of a permanent risk 
of death faced by individuals within the economy. One might expect that introducing more 
heterogeneity by allowing for different life spans of individuals leads to difficulties 
concerning the framework’s analytical solvability. Blanchard avoids these potential 
difficulties by developing a model assuming constant mortality rates. Thus, each agent faces 
the same probability of death from period to period, regardless of his/her age. One can say 
that this approach leads to a “handy” model, but of course creates new sources for criticism 
because on the one hand Blanchard introduces life time uncertainty but on the other hand his 
approach creates an economy in which everyone has the same future life expectancy. As will 
be seen later in this section this again will have strong and unrealistic implications on 
individual’s behaviour. Nevertheless the Perpetual Youth Model is able to reflect some 
realistic mechanisms concerning effects of retirement and changes in the probability of death. 
I discuss these features in later subsections as well as in the concluding subsection of this 
model (see section 3.2.3). 
For now the following proposition states the core feature of the Perpetual Youth Model. 
 
Remark 3.1: 
Every agent in the Perpetual Youth Model faces the same future life expectancy – regardless 
of her/his individual age. 
 
Proof: The framework’s setup implies an exponential distribution of the random 
variable “time until death” (see Remark 3.2). Therefore agents’ future life expectancy 
is time invariant due the exponential distribution’s property of mermorylessness. As a 
consequence individuals’ age does not influence future life expectancy – it remains 1/p 
throughout time. And as p is assumed constant over time, each agent faces the same 
life expectancy. 
 
As the framework is set in continuous time it is useful to compare the results obtained for the 
Perpetual Youth Model with those from the Ramsey(1928), Cass(1965) and Koopmans(1965) 
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Model of Infinitely Lived Agents to see the effects of the introduction of a constant 
probability of death on households’ behaviour. 
3.2.1  The model 
Blanchard’s framework rests on the assumption of a constant probability of death, defined as 
p. All agents within the economy face the same risk of death throughout their entire life. This 
assumption has important implications as already stated in remark 3.1. As Blanchard points 
out the constant death rate implies an exponential distribution for the random variable “time 
until death”11.  
 
Remark 3.2: 
The assumption of constant mortality implies an exponential distribution of the random 
variable “time until death”. Its density function is given by ( ) )exp( ptptf x −=  with expected 
value 1
0
)exp()( −
∞
=−=Ε ∫ pdtpttpX .  
     
So the expected future lifespan of an agent is 1/p – the first moment of the exponential 
distribution. Clearly, a high probability of death, p, implies a short expected lifetime horizon. 
If p is set to zero the horizon becomes infinite similar to the Ramsey model of Infinitely Lived 
Agents. Therefore - as the Ramsey model can be seen as a special case of the Perpetual Youth 
Model - comparing these two models is convenient to see the implications of the presence of 
life time uncertainty. 
At every instant of time a new cohort of agents is born, consisting of individuals who all have 
the same probability of death. As cohorts are assumed to be “large enough” they decrease 
over time with the constant rate of p12. Thus, although individuals face uncertainty concerning 
their individual length of life, cohorts decrease deterministically through time. Together with 
the normalization of cohort’s size to p it follows that the size of a cohort s – s denoting time of 
birth - at time t is  
( )[ ]stpp −−exp . 
                                                 
11 The exponential distribution has the property of being „memoryless”. This special property of the exponential 
distribution allows for constant, and thus age-independent, life expectancy.  
12 This is implied by the “Law of Large Numbers”.  “Large enough” ensures that the Law of large numbers can 
be applied. 
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This normalization ensures that at any point in time total population is equal to one13. 
3.2.1.1 Life Insurance as a consequence of uncertain life time  
The probability of dying alters the maximization problem of agents in the Perpetual Youth 
Model. Life time uncertainty leads to a problem for individual’s behaviour. Assuming that 
individuals maximize their total lifetime utility without caring about their relatives and 
prohibiting negative bequests the probability of dying gives rise to an optimality problem. 
Typically agents will die leaving positive or negative bequests behind. Leaving positive 
bequests implies that the individual has not consumed as much as would have been possible, 
meaning that s/he has not shown optimal behaviour. Blanchard therefore introduces a life 
insurance company, offering positive and negative life insurance. An individual who has 
accumulated wealth over time, facing the risk of leaving positive wealth behind, would be 
better off selling the claim on his or her wealth contingent on his/her death to this insurance 
company. In exchange for the claim on the estates of the individual, the insurance company 
makes premium payments to the living. This very important feature of the Perpetual Youth 
Model is stated in the following assumption.  
 
Remark 3.3: 
Facing life time uncertainty, rational individuals are going to contract all their wealth to a life 
insurance company to avoid suboptimal consumption behaviour. 
 
The life insurance company is assumed not to make any profits implying an insurance 
premium of p per unit time. Rational agents will then contract to have all their wealth, tν , go 
to the insurance company in case of their death, if negative bequests are assumed to be 
prohibited and in the absence of altruistic behaviour. In exchange individuals receive a 
premium tpν  per unit time.  
The insurance company faces no uncertainty since the constant mortality rate p implies a non-
stochastic death rate of p per unit time. Since population is normalized to one at any point in 
time, the insurance company receives tpν  from the dying and pays premia tpν  to those 
living.  
                                                 
13 ( )[ ] 1exp =−−∫
∞−
t
dsstpp  
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3.2.1.2 Consumption and Wealth 
The following section solves the individual agent’s maximization problem and derives 
aggregate magnitudes of consumption and wealth. The calculation will result in a system of 
equations which will be used to show the impact of mortality on the economy. 
 
Individual Consumption 
Individuals maximize their total life time utility facing a permanent risk of death. Thus, at 
time t an individual maximizes his/her expected total future utility arising from consumption, 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−∫∞
t
tdztzzcuE |)](exp[))(( θ         (3.5) 
where u(c(z)) is the utility of consumption at time z and θ is a parameter measuring time 
preference. The higher θ, the less future consumption is valued compared to current 
consumption. Taking the expectation over the future utility reflects the uncertainty resulting 
from the risk of death. From the fact that the constant probability of death implies an 
exponential distribution of survivorship it follows that the probability for an individual - that 
survived until time t - to be still alive at a later point in time z is exp[-p(z-t)]. Blanchard 
assumes logarithmic utility of consumption yielding the individual’s objective function  
dztzpzc
t
)])((exp[)(log −+−∫
∞
θ .        (3.6) 
Here one can make the first comparison to the Ramsey model. Compared to the maximization 
problem of an infinitely lived agent in the Ramsey model the objective function has changed 
by increasing the rate at which future utility is discounted from θ to θ + p14.  
 
After defining the objective function I now turn to the individual’s budget constraint. 
Individuals have two sources of non-labour income (non-human wealth) )(zν 15. First they 
receive income due to the interest r(z) earned on their savings and second they additionally 
receive the premium from the insurance company. As mentioned before the total premium 
received by the insured person is pv(z) as rational agents will contract their entire amount of 
assets to life insurance (see 3.2.1.1). So in total the effective rate of interest on assets equals r 
                                                 
14 In the Ramey model the representative agent maximizes ∫
∞
−−=
t
t dztzzcuU )](exp[))(( θ  (compare 
Blanchard(1989), page 48). 
15 Non human wealth describes the wealth accumulated by an individual over time while human wealth is the 
discounted future labor income.  
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+ p. Thus, compared to an infinitely lived agent in the Ramsey Model, the probability of 
death increases the effective interest rate of individual’s assets by the death rate p. In total this 
yields individual’s dynamic budget constraint as 
)()()(])([)( zczyzvpzr
dz
zdv −++=         (3.7) 
Thus, the difference between labour income y(z) and consumption c(z) plus the effective 
interest on his/her wealth. To avoid individuals going into debt forever a no-Ponzi-game 
condition is implemented. It states that, in the limit, the present value of an individual’s assets 
must be equal to zero.  
0)(])([explim =
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +− ∫∞→ zvdpr
z
t
z
µµ         (3.8) 
Without this condition individuals could accumulate debt forever and, as leaving negative 
bequests behind is prohibited, could protect themselves by buying life insurance.  
After the objective function and the dynamic budget constraint are defined one can now turn 
to solving the individual’s maximization problem.  
 
Optimum: 
The first order condition for agent’s consumption is given by 
[ ]{ } )(])([)()()()( zczrzcppzr
dz
zdc θθ −=+−+= .       (3.9) 
 
Let individual’s human wealth be denoted by h(t) and the discount factor by R(t,z). An 
individual’s consumption at time t in the Perpetual Youth economy is given by the following 
equations:  
(i) )]()()[()( thtvptc ++= θ                    
(ii) ∫
∞
=
t
dzztRzyth ),()()(                  (3.10)  
(iii) ( )[ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−≡ ∫z
t
dprztR µµexp),(   
 
Proof: see Appendix A.3. 
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The term (θ+p) gives the individual’s propensity to consume. As is apparent from 3.10(i) the 
propensity to consume is independent of the interest rate r and of individual age. 
Independence from the interest rate follows from the assumption of logarithmic utility which 
implies unit elasticity of substitution between consumption over different periods (compare 
proposition 3.1). On the other hand age-independency of the individual’s propensity to 
consume follows from the constant probability of death. Thus, all economic agents have the 
same propensity to consume, regardless of their age. This result is very problematic from a 
demographic point of view as one expects consumption behaviour to change with age. Further 
more it points out the perpetuity of agents’ lifes in this model.  
 
Aggregate Consumption 
After considering individual behaviour I now turn to the aggregation of consumption. For this 
the aggregate magnitudes of human wealth and non-human wealth have to be derived. 
Aggregate consumption follows from summing up individual consumption over all living 
generations. Thus, aggregate consumption follows as 
dsstpptsctC
t
)]([exp),()( −−= ∫
∞−
                  (3.11) 
where c(s,t) denotes consumption at time t of a generation born at time s and pexp[-p(t-s)] is 
the size of the generation born t-s periods ago. For aggregate labour income Y(t), nonhuman 
wealth V(t) and human wealth H(t) definitions are analogue.  
 
Remark 3.4: 
Aggregate consumption at time t is given by equation 3.12 
)]()()[()( tVtHptC ++= θ .                   (3.12) 
 
Proof: see Appendix A 
 
In remark 3.4 the aggregate expressions of human and non-human wealth are already used. 
These are derived in the following subsection. 
 
Aggregate Human and Nonhuman Wealth  
The dynamic behaviour of human wealth depends strongly on the assumptions made on 
labour income. In order to be able to take into account decreasing labour income with 
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retirement and thus with age Blanchard assumes the distribution of labour income across 
different generations at a certain point in time t to follow  
 
Remark 3.5: 
The distribution of labour income across generations is given by the equation  
)](exp[)(),( sttaYtsy −−= α , α ≥ 0.      (3.13) 
 
The exponential term captures the decline of labour income with cohort’s age. The parameter 
α measures the degree at which labour income decreases from younger to older cohorts and a 
is a constant16. Clearly α equal to zero implies constant and therefore age-independent labour 
income. This definition implies that labour income y(t) is smaller for members of older 
generations, as long as α is not zero. And, if aggregate labour income Y(t) is assumed to be 
constant over time, individual labour income decreases steadily over lifetime.  
 
Remark 3.6: 
Aggregate human wealth follows  
[ ] )()()()( tYtHptr
dt
tH −++= α        (3.14) 
where 0)]([exp)(lim =
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++− ∫∞→
z
t
z
drpzH µµα .      (3.15) 
Proof: see Appendix A 
 
Remark 3.7: 
Aggregate non-human wealth V(t) follows 
).()()()()( tCtYtVtr
dt
tdV −+=        (3.16) 
Proof: see Appendix A 
 
Comparing equation (3.7) for the accumulation of individual nonhuman wealth with equation 
(3.16) shows a striking difference. Individual nonhuman wealth accumulates at rate r+p but 
aggregate wealth only at rate r. This is not surprising as the insurance premium payments – in 
                                                 
16 The value of a is (α+p)/p. The calculation can be found in the appendix A.4. 
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aggregate a total of pV(t) – do not represent an increase in total wealth but a transfer payment 
from those who have died to those still living.  
 
Aggregate Behaviour 
Collecting previously derived equations, the following system of equations describes the 
Perpetual Youth economy in its aggregate 
)]()()[()( tVtHptC ++= θ         (3.12) 
).()()()()( tCtYtVtr
dt
tdV −+=        (3.16) 
[ ] )()()()( tYtHptr
dt
tH −++= α        (3.14) 
0)]([exp)(lim =
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++− ∫∞→
z
t
z
drpzH µµα       (3.15) 
 
How does the presence of mortality affect the economy according to these equations? 
Viewing equation 3.12 and 3.14 shows, that both, propensity to consume and the discount rate 
of human wealth (the term in brackets on the right hand side of equation 3.14) are increasing 
functions of the probability of death. Thus, an increase in p increases the propensity to 
consume and reduces the value of future income. Also an increase in α - the decline rate of 
labour income - increases the discount rate of aggregate human wealth. The faster labour 
income declines over time, the higher the discount rate of aggregate future labour income. 
 
Notice: an alternative representation of aggregate consumption is given by equation 3.17. This 
will be more convenient for the following analysis (see Appendix A.5) 
VppCr
dt
dC ))(()( θαθα ++−−+=        (3.17) 
3.2.2 Characteristics of the general equilibrium 
Blanchard assumes a simple production function ),( LKF  where output is produced by 
capital and labour. Population size – and thus labour force - is normalized to one. Both input 
factors are paid their marginal products. 
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The effect of mortality 
To study the impact of mortality on the equilibrium, labour income is initially held constant. 
In the case of constant labour income - α is equal to zero – it follows from (3.17) and (3.16) 
that the dynamics of the economy are given by17 
[ ] KppCKF
dt
dC )()´( θθ +−−=        (3.18) 
CKF
dt
dK −= )( .         (3.19) 
 
Figure 3.3: Dynamic adjustment with uncertain lifetime in the case of constant labour income (Blanchard, 
Fisher ; page 123) 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the phase diagram of the dynamic system under the assumption of constant 
labour income. The two loci 0=
dt
dC  and 0=
dt
dK  describe the dynamic behaviour of 
consumption and capital. From equation (3.18) it follows that the first locus is an increasing 
function of K and approaches Kmax asymptotically. The second locus is concave since F(K) is 
a concave function. 
Proposition 3.2: 
The steady state capital stock K* lies between the boundaries ( )pKF +<< θθ *)´(  where 
Kmin denotes the level of capital for which F´(Kmin) = θ + p and for Kmax is such that F´(Kmax) 
= θ.  
Proof: Appendix A 
 
                                                 
17 Using r=F´(K) and V=K. For the second locus use Y=F(K)-KF´(K) from assumption of competitive markets 
and rV=F´(K)K. 
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The fact that F´(K*) is greater than θ implies that, under the assumption of constant labour 
income, the equilibrium is always dynamically efficient. This is due to the fact, that the upper 
boundary Kmax is necessarily inferior to the level of capital that maximizes consumption, KGR 
– the Golden Rule Level of capital - which satisfies F´(KGR)=0 18. A second striking result is 
stated in the next proposition. 
 
Proposition 3.3: 
K* is a decreasing function of the probability of death - p. Thus, increasing mortality causes 
decreasing capital accumulation. 
 
Proof:  
An increase in p shifts the 0=dtdC  locus to the left. For a given level of K an increase 
in p requires C to increase in order to keep the relation 0=dtdC . This leads to the shift 
in the locus and a decreasing K*. 
 
Since K* is decreasing in p a higher probability of death increases the interest rate and 
decreases the capital stock. In the extreme case of r equal to θ there would be no capital 
accumulation at all. This is due to the assumption of constant labour income. Since 
individuals are born without nonhuman wealth (V) they would simply consume as much as 
they earn and neither save nor dissave. This can be seen by setting r equal to θ and V equal to 
zero in equation (3.17). Then the rate of change of consumption would be zero and thus 
constant through time. The assumption of constant labour income together with the fact that 
consumption doesn’t change, implies that agents choose consumption equal to income. As a 
consequence an interest rate superior to θ is needed to allow for capital accumulation.  
 
The effect of retirement 
If labour income is assumed to decrease over time - 0>α  - individuals have an incentive to 
save. As mentioned before this decrease in labour income is meant to capture the effect of 
retirement. Concerning the properties of the steady state the assumption of decreasing labour 
income can lead to dynamic inefficiency. In contrast to the case of constant labour income the 
steady state capital stock is no longer restricted to being inferior to the Golden Rule Level. 
                                                 
18 From dK/dt=0 the maximal level of C follows as F´(K)=0.  
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Figure 3.4 shows the phase diagram for this scenario. In the case of declining labour income 
the two loci are given by 
[ ] KppCKF
dt
dC ))(()´( θαθα ++−−+=       (3.20) 
CKF
dt
dK −= )( .         (3.19) 
Kmax now is defined as F’(Kmax)=θ-α. As θ-α can be negative or positive, the capital stock K 
can be superior to the Golden Rule Level of capital, which again satisfies F´(KGR)=0. Thus 
the steady state capital stock can be dynamically inefficient, as illustrated in figure 3.4. 
 
Proposition 3.4: 
The effect of retirement on income in this framework leads to increasing capital 
accumulation. 
 
Proof: 
Analysing the consequences of declining labour income (represented by an increase in 
α) shows that an increase in α shifts the 0=dtdC  locus down leading to an increase in 
the capital stock as long as p+θ is assumed to be small (at least smaller than one). 
Then an increase in α increases both terms in equation 3.20. This increase is smaller 
on the ride hand side as long as the p+θ term is small. Thus, for a given level of C, K 
must increase to keep the equation 0=dtdC . Blanchard (1985) proofs the proposition by 
deriving the derivative of the 0=dtdC  locus with respect to α (see Blanchard (1985), 
page 238)19.  
 
The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward. Facing declining labour income with 
age individuals decide to save for later times (save for “retirement”). This leads to an 
increase in capital accumulation which decreases the interest rate. In total this can lead to 
capital over accumulation and thus to dynamical inefficiency.   
                                                 
19 Blanchard’s result of the derivation is either slightly incorrect (according to my opinion the last equation’s 
denominator should be to the power of two) or not well comprehensible. I therefore only refer to his result but do 
not explicitly replicate his calculation. But as long as p+θ is assumed to be small enough the proposition is 
correct. 
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic adjustment with uncertain lifetime in the case of decreasing labour income 
(Blanchard, Fisher; page 126) 
3.2.3 Lifecycle aspects of the model 
In summary the presence of lifetime uncertainty in the Perpetual Youth Model yields two 
opposing dynamics as stated in propositions 3.3 and 3.4. First, the uncertain lifetime horizon 
leads to decreasing capital accumulation. The higher the probability of death, or equivalently 
the shorter the horizon, the lower is capital accumulation. Second, opposing this effect, 
reduced labour income during lifetime leads to increased savings and consequently to an 
increasing steady state capital stock. Depending on the size of these effects, the equilibrium of 
the economy can be dynamically inefficient (which would indicate capital over 
accumulation).  
 
The model’s framework introduces individual life time uncertainty. Thus, it makes good 
progress concerning demographic realism. But the unrealistic assumption of a constant 
probability of death also implies constant, and so age-independent, propensities to consume 
(compare equation (3.10)). Compared to the two period model of Diamond this is a clear 
drawback, as this is in sharp contrast to what one would expect to occur in reality. The 
assumptions made upon the distribution of labour income (compare equation (3.13)) also lack 
realism, as they imply that older cohorts have less labour income compared to younger ones. 
Again this is counterintuitive, as one would expect labour income to increase during working 
lifetime before decreasing before retirement. Nevertheless the dynamics implied by the model 
seem to capture some realistic dynamics, as the probability of death decreases capital 
accumulation and retirement increases it. 
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3.3 A model of retirees and workers (Gertler) 
The previous section showed a quite simple approach of achieving more realism in OLG 
models. In his model Gertler extends Blanchard’s model of Perpetual Youth by introducing 
two stages of life, one stage of working life and a second representing retirement. This 
extension allows for more heterogeneity among economic agents. In this set-up individuals 
are born as workers and face a permanent risk of being retired. Thus, they face uncertainty 
concerning their income status from one period to the next. The retirement risk is assumed to 
be constant through time so that workers do not differ concerning their individual retirement 
risk. Workers do not face any direct lifetime uncertainty, as mortality is assumed only to 
occur among retirees. Once retired, individuals are confronted with a constant risk of death, as 
in the Blanchard model. The transition from worker to retiree as well as the transition from 
retiree to death is modelled analogue to the mortality framework of the Perpetual Youth 
Model. The constant transition rates imply expected lifetime and working time in fashion of 
the Blanchard model.  
 
In contrast to Blanchard’s framework Gertler’s model yields two sources of uncertainty. Both 
have implications on the model’s framework. As in the Model of Perpetual Youth, Gertler 
assumes the existence of a life insurance company, redistributing wealth from dying retirees 
to those surviving (compare 3.2.1.1). The risk of falling out of the labour force implies that 
workers are potentially confronted with a loss in income – their wage. To address the problem 
of potential retirement agents’ preferences are restricted to risk neutrality. Doing so yields 
certainty equivalent decision rules for workers facing income risk, as Gertler remarks (Gertler 
(1999), page 67). 
3.3.1 Description of the model 
The probability for a worker to remain working from one period to the next is defined as ω. 
As this probability is assumed to be independent of the agents working tenure, the expected 
length of working life follows to be 1/(1-ω) using the same argument as in Blanchard’s Model 
of Perpetual Youth20. Starting with retirement agents face a constant probability of death, 
defined as 1-γ. Analogue to the working horizon, the average life expectancy, once retired, is 
1/(1-γ).  
                                                 
20 As in Blanchard’s model, the constant probabilities of retirement and death imply exponential distributions for 
the variables “time until retirement” and “time until death”. Thus the mentioned expected values follow as the 
first moments of the exponential distribution. 
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Individuals value their current state according to a CES non-expected utility function, which 
restricts workers to risk neutrality concerning income risk, but takes into account agents’ 
desire to smooth consumption over different periods. Agents’ value-function takes the form 
( ) { }[ ] ρρρ β 11 | zVECV ttztzt ++=        (3.21)  
where C denotes consumption and β is a discount factor, indicating that current consumption 
has a different value to agents than future consumption. The superscript (z = w, r) denotes 
whether the individual is a worker or a retiree. The discount parameter for retirees differs 
from the worker’s discount factor, due to the probability of death. Thus, βw=β and βr=β*γ. 
The expression { }zVE tt |1+  is the expectation of the value function next period, conditional on 
the individual’s current status in the life cycle (r or w). Thus, for workers and retirees 
following expressions give the expected value for the next period 
{ } rtttt VVwVE 111 )1(| +++ −+= ωω ω  
{ } rttt VrVE 11 | ++ =   
As Gertler states it, this way of modelling the preferences of individuals generates certainty 
equivalent decision rules (Gertler, page 67). Workers face the uncertainty of potential 
retirement, and consequently income loss, by averaging the value function over their two 
potential future states. Doing so, they only care about the expected value of their future 
income. The presence of the parameter ρ indicates agents’ desire to smooth their consumption 
over time. 
Concerning the risk of death for retirees, Gertler follows Blanchard’s approach of assuming 
an insurance company redistributing from the dying to the surviving. It follows that each 
surviving retiree receives payments from the insurance company at a rate of R/γ on his/her 
wealth, if R denotes the gross return rate on assets21.   
 
Consumption by Retirees   
In the following subsections I will derive retirees’, workers’ and aggregate consumption. As 
retirees are assumed not to have any labour income, their only source of income is out of 
assets. Assets and consumption of a retiree at time t are denoted by rjktA  and 
rjk
tC  where j is 
an index for the time of birth and k denotes the time, when the retiree left the labour force. 
Clearly, the amount of assets accumulated by an agent depends on how long an agent remains 
                                                 
21 As only the fraction γ of retirees survives, gross returns are spilt up equally among the surviving retirees. Thus 
each retiree receives a rate of R/γ on his/her assets. 
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part of the labour force. It is therefore necessary to capture the individual’s length of working 
life in order to quantify his/her amount of assets. This is done by writing k as a superscript. 
The implicit assumption that agents with the same “biography” (same date of birth and same 
date of retirement) are economically the same (compare section 6.Probabilistic Aging) will 
make aggregation easy. Thus, a surviving retiree’s assets accumulate at   
rjk
t
rjk
tt
rjk
t CARA −=+ )/(1 γ          (3.22) 
A retired agent chooses consumption so as to maximize his/her value function (3.21) subject 
to the asset accumulation equation (3.22).  
 
Retirees’ Optimality conditions: 
Solving the maximization problem yields the consumption Euler equation for retirees 
as  
rjk
tt
rjk
t CRC
σβ )( 11 ++ = .        (3.23) 
  
Thus retiree’s change in consumption from period t to t+1 is determined by the interest 
rate and the subjective discount rate. Further calculation finally yields retirees’ 
consumption at time t: 
 
Let ttπε  denote the retirees’ marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (mpcw). 
Retirees’ consumption at time t is given by 
rjk
tttt
rjk
t ARC )/( γπε=        (3.24) 
where the propensity to consume fulfils the following difference equation 
1,1
)(1
11
1
1
=−=
−=
++
−
+
σβγ
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πεγβπε σσ
if
R
tt
tt
ttt       (3.25) 
 
Proof: see Appendix A 
 
In equation 3.24 and 3.25 tπ  denotes the worker’s mpcw. Consequently εt gives the factor, at 
which the retiree’s mpcw exceeds the worker’s mpcw.  
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Impact of uncertainties on retirees’ consumption decision:  
Viewing these equations gives a first insight on the impact of mortality on the economy. 
Notice first that in the case of logarithmic preferences (σ=1) the mpcw is constant. But for 
other values of σ the propensity to consume depends on the interest rate (see equation 3.25). 
The set-up of the model again implies that for all retirees the propensity to consume at time t 
is the same. As in the Perpetual Youth model the individual retiree’s age does not influence 
consumption behaviour. In this sense retiree’s mpcw is independent of the individual’s age, 
but not of the individual’s state in the life cycle (the PA model presented in section 6 extends 
this distinction between “age” and the position in the life cycle). This feature of consumption 
behaviour will make aggregation easy. As in Blanchard’s model, an increasing probability of 
death (decrease in γ) raises the retiree’s mpcw again reflecting what one expects to be the 
result from increased mortality. 
Consumption by Workers 
In contrast to retirees, workers earn labour income Wt. Their rate of return on assets is Rt and 
thus inferior to the retiree’s rate of return, due to the fact that the insurance company only 
redistributes among retirees. For a worker, born at time j, the asset accumulation follows as 
wj
tt
wj
tt
wj
t CWARA −+=+1           (3.26) 
The worker’s maximization problem yields a more complicated decision rule for consumption 
than for retirees. The higher complexity results from the fact, that workers have to take into 
account the possibility of being retired and consequently the changing consumption behaviour 
implied by retirement (we expect increasing consumption as people move to retirement).  
 
Workers’ Optimality Conditions: 
Let w
t
w
t
r
t
r
t
t CV
CV
11
11
1 /
/
++
++
+ ∂∂
∂∂≡Λ  denote the marginal rate of substitution of consumption across 
work and retirement. Workers’ maximization problem yields the first order necessary 
condition  
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tt
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t CRCC
σβωω )()1( 11)1(111 ++++++ Ω=Λ−+       (3.27) 
 and Ωt+1 is a factor that weights the gross return Rt+1 and is given by 
σεωω −++ −+=Ω 1
1
11 )1( tt .        (3.28) 
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The Euler equation (3.27) states that a worker, knowing that s/he might be retired next 
period with a probability 1-ω, takes both possible future states into account for 
deriving his/her decision rule for consumption. It states, that the desired growth in 
consumption from period t to t+1 depends on the interest rate R relative to the 
subjective discount rate β.  
 
Definition 3.1: 
Workers’ human wealth is defined as  
∑∏
∞
= = ++
+
Ω= 0
1
/v v
z ztzt
vtj
t
R
WH ω .       (3.29) 
 
Let π denote the worker’s mpcw and jtH  his/her discounted future labour income. 
Worker’s consumption at time t is given by  
)( jt
wj
tt
wj
t HARC += π         (3.30) 
where the propensity to consume fulfils the following difference equation 
1
1
11 )(1
+
−
++ Ω−=
t
t
ttt R π
πβπ σσ       (3.31) 
ß−= 1  if σ=1 
 
Proof: Appendix A 
 
Impact of uncertainties on workers consumption decision: 
Considering workers’ optimality conditions shows the impact of retirement risk and mortality 
on workers’ consumption behaviour. As for retirees the propensity to consume is equal among 
workers. In contrast to retiree’s mpcw the Ω term enters the worker’s mpcw. This Ω factor is 
of high relevance in Gertler’s framework. It is an increasing function in ε, the factor by which 
the retiree’s mpcw exceeds the worker’s mpcw and is higher than one, if ageing has a positive 
probability. The appearance of the term thus reflects the impact of ageing on the worker’s 
decision process. The Λ term on the other hand indicates changing consumption behaviour as 
agents move from work to retirement and thus also reflects the impact of mortality on workers 
decisions.  
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In order to see the implications of the life cycle aspects on agents behaviour it is again 
convenient to make comparison to the case of infinite lives – just as done before in 
Blanchard’s model. The presence of a life cycle implies a higher propensity to consume out of 
wealth than would be the case for an infinitely lived agent. This follows from the fact that Ω 
is greater than one22. Additionally the discount rate of future labour income increases, 
compared to infinite lives (compare equation (3.29)). While an infinite horizon implies a 
discount rate of R, this setting with a life cycle yields RΩ/ω as discount rate. The fact that 
R>1 and ω<1 implies that RΩ/ω>R and thus the discount rate is greater than the infinite 
horizon case. This increase comes on the one hand from the risk of retirement which makes 
workers put lower weight on future labour income – represented by ω in the discount factor.  
On the other hand the Ω  term reflects the fact of different propensities to consume out of 
wealth. As the propensity to consume is higher for retirees than for workers – or equivalently 
the consumption out of wealth is lower for workers - an additional unit of wealth has a higher 
value for workers than for retirees as workers can smooth their consumption over more 
periods. The marginal utility gain of an additional unit of wealth is lower for retirees than for 
workers23. This higher utility gain is reflected by the Ω term in the discount factor.  
 
Aggregate consumption 
The previous section showed that retirees and workers differ in their consumption behaviour 
and how both sources of uncertainty affected workers and retirees in their consumption 
behaviour. In this subsection I derive aggregate consumption and analyse the impact of 
retirement and mortality on the aggregated economy. 
As the propensity to consume at time t is equal across retirees, the aggregate consumption of 
retirees rtC  follows by summing up equation (3.24) across all individual retirees. 
r
tA  denotes 
aggregate assets of retirees in period t which in total earn an interest rate of Rt. Thus aggregate 
consumption of retirees is given by 
r
tttt
r
t ARC πε=          (3.32) 
Just as in the Model of Perpetual Youth, the aggregate consumption of retirees differs from 
the individual retiree’s consumption by the factor of redistribution. Again the same argument 
holds. Insurance payments do not increase total wealth of retirees, and thus total consumption, 
                                                 
22 This follows from the fact, that ε - the ratio of retiree’s to worker’s mpcw – is greater than one. Compare 
equation (3.28). 
23 Gertler page 71. 
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but redistributes from dying to surviving retirees. So in total there is no gain in non-human 
wealth from insurance.  
From (3.30) for workers aggregate consumption is given by 
)( t
w
ttt
w
t HARC += π          (3.33) 
 
Definition 3.2:  
Aggregate human wealth is defined as 
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The discount rate for aggregate human wealth increases compared to individual worker’s 
discount rate by the population growth rate (1+n). This is due to the fact, that the share of the 
total wage bill of those currently alive declines over time as the labour force grows (Gertler 
(1999), page 72).  
 
Remark 3.8: 
Defining the share of assets held by retirees as λt, the aggregate consumption function is given 
by 
[ ]{ }ttttttt HARC +−+= λεπ )1(1 .        (3.35) 
 Proof: Appendix A 
 
Remark 3.9: 
The retirees’ share of assets develops according to 
)1()1(
1
1 ωλπεωλ −+−=
+
+
t
t
ttttt A
A
R .        (3.36) 
 Proof: Appendix A 
 
Impact of uncertainties on aggregate consumption: 
The life cycle feature of the framework affects aggregate human wealth in three ways. First, 
as for individual human wealth, workers know that their expected working tenure is finite. 
This leads to an increasing discount rate on future labour income, as the worker can not be 
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sure of how long s/he will be remaining part of the labour force. This fact is represented by 
the presence of the ω in the discount term. Second, as agents wish to smooth their 
consumption over different periods, the utility gain from additional income is higher the 
earlier it is earned. This is represented by the term Ω. And finally, the population growth rate 
1+n increases the discount rate of aggregate human wealth. 
 
Aggregate consumption depends on the distribution of wealth between retirees and workers 
(λt) reflecting the fact that the different consumption behaviour of retirees and workers has a 
bearing on aggregate consumption.  
3.3.2 Characteristics of the general equilibrium 
The economy’s output is produced following a Cobb-Douglas production function  
αα −= 1)( tttt KNXY            (3.37) 
where Xt denotes the state of technology and Kt equals total assets At. Productivity grows at 
the exogenous rate 1+x, thus Xt+1=(1+x)Xt. Capital depreciates at rate δ. Assuming 
competitive markets wage and the interest rate follow as the marginal products of labour and 
capital. Thus  
t
t
t N
Y
W α=            (3.38) 
and 
)1()1( δα −+−=
t
t
t K
Y
R .        (3.39) 
Capital accumulates at  
tttt KCYK )1(1 δ−+−=+ .        (3.40) 
To study the effects of mortality and ageing it is convenient to view the economy in its steady 
state.  
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Remark 3.10: 
The steady state of the economy can be expressed as a system of seven non-linear equations  
(i) [ ]{ }hRkknx +−+−=++ λεπδ )1(11)(        
(ii) σβγω
γψλ
)(1
)1)(1(
Rnx
nnx
−++
−+++=          
(iii) 
)1(
),(
nxR
RRh ++−ΩΓ=
α          
(iv) δα −+−= − 1)1( 1kR         (3.41) 
(v) σσ βπ 1)(1 −Ω−= R           
(vi) γβεπ σσ 11 −−= R          
(vii) σεωω −−+=Ω 1
1
)1(        
 
In remark 3.10 k and h denote assets and human capital after normalizing to output and Ψ is 
the ratio of retirees to workers. Γ(R,Ω) is the fraction of human wealth sstH to the level that 
would result in the steady state of the representative agent model sstH
* 24. These seven 
equations are the steady state versions of the previously defined variables k, λ, h, R, π, ε and 
Ω. The following section will explain the impact of ageing and mortality on the economy 
using this system of equations. 
 
The effects of mortality and income risk  
Mortality and income risk affect the economy in three ways. The first striking result is, that 
the capital stock depends negatively on λ, the retiree’s share of non-human wealth. This share 
again depends on Ψ, the ratio of retirees to workers. A rise in the retiree’s asset’s share λ 
lowers the capital stock, since retiree’s mpcw is superior to the worker’s mpcw. Thus a rise in 
λ rises total consumption and thus reduces the economy’s steady state savings which equal 
the economy’s investment.  
                                                 
24 Ht grows at rate (1+x)(1+n)≈1+x+n in the steady state, so [ ]ω/)1(/)1)(1( Ω++++= RnnxHWH ssttsst  
and RnxHWH sstt
ss
t /)1)(1(*
* +++= . Thus [ ]Ω+−= /)1(/ ωxRRWH tsst and 
[ ].)1(/* nxRRWH tsst ++−= The fraction Γ(R,Ω) results as Ω+−
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nxR
H
HR ss
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t . 
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Second, the presence of life cycle increases both, retiree’s and worker’s propensity to 
consume -  επ and ε - compared to infinite lives. Thus, the probability of dying, or retiring, 
raises the propensity to consume which again reduces k.  
The third effect is the reduction of human wealth h. Compared to infinite lives human wealth 
is reduced to the fraction Γ(R,Ω) of human wealth that would result in the steady state of the 
representative agent model. This is due to the higher discount rate arising in the life cycle 
economy.  
The life cycle economy’s equilibrium thus depends on the dynamics of the labour force and 
the population.  
3.3.3 Life cycle aspects of the model 
Life cycle aspects affect the economy through different channels. As in Blanchard’s model, 
the propensity to consume is an increasing function of the probability of death for retirees 
(compare equation (3.25)). Thus, the higher the probability of death, the faster retirees 
consume out of wealth. But this is also true for workers, even though they do not directly face 
mortality. Their risk of being retired induces them to consume at a higher rate than they 
would, if they were infinitely lived (compare equation (3.29)).  
The second effect of the life cycle on the economy is that the worker’s risk of retirement leads 
to an increase in the discount rate on human wealth. Additionally, retiree’s higher propensity 
to consume leads to a further increase in this discount rate. 
Concerning the aggregate consumption function (3.33), a striking modification is the 
appearance of the retiree’s share of assets. The distribution of wealth between retirees and 
workers matters, as propensities to consume are different. This difference in the consumption 
behaviour on the individual’s level is reflected in the aggregate consumption function by the 
appearance of λ, which is an increasing function of the retiree’s population share (compare 
equation (3.35)).  
 
Compared to Blanchard’s model, Gertler achieves improvements concerning demographic 
realism. As aggregate consumption (3.33) depends on the retirees share on assets, a change in 
the population structure will affect consumption. On the other hand he introduces 
heterogeneity among agents of the economy by modelling two different stages of life. This is 
a clear improvement, as the main drawback of Blanchard’s model is the implication of age-
independent consumption behaviour (compare equation (3.10)).   
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Appendix A 
 
The Diamond Model 
 
A.1 Maximization problem in the Diamond Model 
To solve the individual’s maximization problem one has to maximize the utility function  
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with respect to the budget constraint  
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To calculate the first order conditions one has to set up the Lagrange function, yielding 
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Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to consumption in both periods c1t and c2t+1 results 
in the expressions 
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The first order conditions for c1t and c2t+1 follow by setting these expressions to zero 
λρ =−tc1            A.6 
1
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1
1
1
+
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Inserting A.6 into A.7 and expressing in terms of c2t+1 
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1
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and further inserting into the budget constraint (A.2) yields 
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and rearranging gives 
 39
( )
( ) ( ) tt wrc ρρρ
ρ
θ
θ
−+++
+= 11
1
1
11
1 .        A.10 
Recalling the fact that c1t=(1-st) wt yields an expression for the optimal saving rate s(r) as 
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Proof of Proposition 3.1: 
To understand the influence of the interest rate r on the savings rate s one has to derive the 
derivative of s with respect to r. This yields 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
[ ]2/)1(/1
/)1(
/)1(/)1(/1
/)1(
)1()1(
11111
)(
ρρρ
ρρ
ρρρρρ
ρρ
θ
θ
−
−
−−
−
+++
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
+∂+−+++∂
+∂
=∂
∂
r
r
rrr
r
r
r
rs   A.12 
 
which, by neglecting the denominator, simplifies to 
( )
r
r
∂
+∂ − ρρ /)1(1 ( ) ρθ /11+ .          A.13 
Thus the question, if the savings rate is increasing in r or not, depends on whether this last 
expression is increasing in r or not. Calculating its derivative yields 
( ) ρρρ
ρ /)21(11 −+− r .           A.14 
This is greater than zero if, and only if, ρ < 1. Of course the expression is smaller than zero if, 
and only if ρ > 1. Thus the savings rate is an increasing function of the interest rate if ρ < 1 
and vice versa. 
 
A.2 Marginal products of capital and labour 
To derive the marginal products of capital and labour divide the aggregate capital stock K 
through the size of the labour force L. This gives the capital per unit of labour, denoted by k. 
Taking the derivatives with respect to K respectively L then yields the expressions for wage 
and interest rate: 
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Perpetual Youth Model 
A.3 Optimum: 
The agent maximizes his/her utility function  
dztzpzc
t
)])((exp[)(log −+−∫
∞
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with respect to the dynamic budget constraint  
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and the No-Ponzi-Game condition   
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To derive the first order condition use to maximum principle (see Sydsaeter et.al., page 321). 
Therefore derive the corresponding Hamiltonian which is given by 
( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]zczyzvpzrzzctzpH −+++−+−= µθ logexp    A.20 
Applying the maximum principle requires the derivation of the Hamiltonian with respect to c 
and v (see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, page 508).  
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taking logs of A.21 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )zzctzp µθ loglog =−−+−         A.23 
and differentiating with respect to time (z)  
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inserting from A.22 on the right hand side of A.24 finally yields the first order condition  
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To derive equation (3.10i) one has to integrate the first order condition (3.9) to express c(z) as 
a function of c(t). Thus,  
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The intertemporal form of the budget constraint is given by integrating A.18 forward to some 
time T, 
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multiplying with  
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as defined in (3.10.iii) results in 
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Letting T go to infinity it follows from the no-Ponzi game condition that the left hand side of 
the equation is zero. Defining the present value of labour income as in (3.10.ii) as h(t) yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫∞ +=
t
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Replacing A.26 into the intertemporal budget constraint (A.30) yields 
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This simplifies to 
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Solving the last integral finally yields 
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and so equation (3.10i) follows. 
 
Proof of Remark 3.4: 
Using the definition for aggregate consumption dsstpptsctC
t
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and inserting 
equation (3.10i) yields 
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Since the propensity to consume is independent of age – thus independent of s – it follows 
dsstppthstpptvptC
t
)]([exp)()](exp[)()()( −−+−−+= ∫
∞−
θ      A.35 
which yields equation (3.12)  
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using definitions for H(t) and V(t) in fashion of C(t). 
 
A.4 Derivation of a: 
Inserting the labour income distribution equation from Definition 3.1 into the definition of 
aggregate labour income dsstpptsytY
t
)]([exp),()( −−= ∫
∞−
 yields 
∫
∞−
−−−−=
t
dsstppsttaYtY )](exp[)](exp[)()( α       A.37 
∫
∞−
+−−=
t
dsptsptaYtY )])((exp[)()( α        A.38 
p
ap += α
11             A.39 
Proof of Remark 3.6: 
Recall that individual human wealth is denoted by 
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t
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Including Definition (3.1) of the labour income distribution in the definition of individual 
human wealth (A.40) yields 
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and rearranging gives 
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The term in brackets (A) can be expressed as 
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using the result obtained for a (A.39) and the fact that only the last two exp-functions depend 
on s yields 
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The last integral yields 
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1)01( so that the expression simplifies to  
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Leibniz’s Formula (see Sydsaeter et al., page 154) implies that the differential of H(t) with 
respect to time is given by 
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The last expression (B) simplifies to ( )[ ] ( )tHtrp ++α  yielding in total the expression 
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Proof of Remark 3.7: 
Applying Leibniz’s Formula for the derivative of aggregate non-human wealth with respect to 
time yields 
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which simplifies to 
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Non-human wealth at birth v(t,t) is assumed to be zero. Inserting the budget constraint A.18 
finally yields 
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A.5 Derivation of the first locus equation (3.17): 
Differentiating )]()()[()( tVtHptC ++= θ  with respect to time and replacing the derivatives 
of H(t) and V(t) by their expression from A.48 and A.51 yields 
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The last term (A) can be rearranged to 
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where the first part (B) equals rC(t). Augmenting by αC(t) - αC(t ) leads to 
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Term C yields 
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where term D equals (p+θ)V(t). Thus equation A.57 follows. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.2: 
The first inequality follows from the first locus (3.18) if dC/dt is set to zero. Then F´(K) must 
be superior to θ in order to keep the relation without having the capital stock taking a negative 
value.  
The second inequality is proved through contradiction. Notice first that F(K) is a concave 
function. Suppose that contrary to the second inequality 
( )εθ ++=′ 1pF            A.58 
Setting dC/dt to zero, it follows  
( ) ( )KpC θε +=+1            A.59 
using dK/dt = 0 implies F(K)=C and rearranging A.58 to ( ) εθ pFp −′=+ . Inserting both to 
A.59 yields 
( ) ( ) ( )KpFKF εε −′=+1          A.60 
but this again would imply 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )KKFKFKKFKpFKFKF ′<⇒′<−′=+< εε1     A.61 
This is impossible because of concavity of F(K) implying ( ) ( )KKFKF ′> . 
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Gertler’s model  
 
Proof of Retiree’s Optimality conditions: 
A retiree maximizes the value function  
( ) ( )[ ] ρρρ βγ 11rtrtrt VCV ++=          A.62 
subject to the asset accumulation equation  
rjk
t
rjk
tt
rjk
t CARA −=+ )/(1 γ .           A.63 
The corresponding Bellmann equation (see Grafenhofer et al., page 15) is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ρρρ βγ 11max rtrt
C
r
t VCAV r
t
++=         A.64 
The first order necessary condition follows as the derivative of the value function with respect 
to current consumption tC . This yields 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 011 11
1
111
1
1 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −∂
∂++=∂
∂ −
+
+
+−−
+
ρρρρρ βγρρβγρ tt
t
ttt
t
t V
A
V
CVC
C
V
   A.65 
and consequently 
( ) ( ) 11
1
11 −
+
+
+−
∂
∂= ρρ βγ t
t
t
t VA
V
C          A.66 
Notice that 1+tV  depends on ( ) tttt CARA −=+ γ/1 . Therefore the derivative is given by  
( ) ( )111
1
11 −∂
∂=∂
∂ −
+
+
++ ρβγρ t
t
t
t
t V
A
V
C
V
.        A.67 
 
The envelope theorem implies the reaction of the value function with respect to changes in 
assets as the partial derivative of V with respect to A and evaluating at C (see Sydsaeter et al., 
page 109). To derive the derivative of Vt+1 w.r.t. At+1 first notice that 
( ) 2111 / ++++ −= tttt AARC γ           A.68 
and clearly 
( ) ( )[ ] ρρρ βγ 1211 +++ += ttt VCV          A.69 
Then the derivative follows as 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( )
( ) γρβγρ ρ
ρρρρ
ρ
11
1
11
21
1
1
1
1
1 +−
+
−
++
+
+
−
+
+=∂
∂ t
t
V
tt
t
t RCVC
A
V
t
4444 34444 21      A.70 
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or equivalently 
( ) ( ) γρρ 111111
1 +−
+
−
+
+
+ =∂
∂ t
tt
t
t RCV
A
V
         A.71 
inserting the last expression into A.66 and using ( )ρσ −= 1/1  finally yields the Euler 
equation  
ttt CRC
σβ )( 11 ++ = .           A.72 
 
Denoting ttπε  as the retirees’ marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (mpcw) 
consumption in period t is given by  
rjk
tttt
rjk
t ARC )/( γπε=           A.73 
To find a solution for the value function (and thus for optimal consumption!), conjecture that  
r
t
r
t
r
t CV ∆=             A.74 
Substitute this in the objective function resulting in 
( ) ( )[ ] ρρρ βγ 111 rtrtrtrtrt CCC ++∆+=∆          A.75 
inserting the Euler equation A.72 yields 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ρρσρ ββγ 111 rttrtrtrtrt CRCC ++∆+=∆         A.76 
solving for ∆ gives 
( ) ( )ρσσρ γβ rttrt R 1111 +−+ ∆+=∆           A.77 
rearranging gives 
( )
ρ
σσ
ρ γβ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∆
∆−=∆
+−
+ r
t
r
t
tr
t
R 1111
1          A.78 
denoting 
ρ
πε ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∆= ttt
1  and 
ρ
πε ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∆= +++ 111
1
t
tt respectively finally results in  
11
1
1 )(1
++
−
+−=
tt
tt
ttt R πε
πεγβπε σσ          A.79 
 
Proof of Workers’ Optimality Conditions: 
A worker maximizes his/her value function  
( ) ( )[ ][ ] ρρρ ωωβ 111 1 rtwtwtwt VVCV ++ −++=        A.80 
subject to 
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wj
tt
wj
tt
wj
t CWARA −+=+1          A.81 
The first order necessary condition is given by the derivative of the value function A.80 wrt. 
Ct 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 011111
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or equivalently 
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Derivatives of w
t
w
t
A
V
1
1
+
+
∂
∂
 and r
t
r
t
A
V
1
1
+
+
∂
∂
are similar to the retirees’ case yielding 
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and 
( ) ( )[ ]11111
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1 1
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+
+
+ =∂
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r
tr
t
r
t RCV
A
V ρρ ρρ          A.85 
Notice the difference in the change in retirees’ value function w.r.t. At+1. This results from the 
fact that the agent retires in period t+1 and therefore received an interest rate of R on his/her 
wealth. 
 
Inserting A.84, A.85 and using the conjectures   
r
t
r
t
r
t CV ∆= , wtwtwt CV ∆=  and ρπ 1−=∆ twt        A.86 
in A.83 yields 
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This becomes 
( )[ ] 11111 11 11 1 −+++−+−+− Λ−+Ω= ρρρρ ωωβ rttwtttt CCRC       A.88 
using the definitions 
w
t
r
t
t
1
1
1
+
+
+ ∆
∆≡Λ             A.89 
and  
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rearranging finally gives 
wj
ttt
trj
tt
wj
t CRCC
σβωω )()1( 11)1(111 ++++++ Ω=Λ−+        A.91 
 
As in retirees’ optimality problem, insert the conjectured solution for wtV  and 
r
tV to the value 
function, 
( ) ( )[ ][ ] ρρρ ωωβ 11111 1 rtrtwtwtwtwtwt CCCC ++++ ∆−+∆+=∆        A.92 
substituting from the first order condition A.91 gives then 
( ) ( )[ ][ ] ρρσρ ββ 1111 wtttwtwtwtwt CRCC +++ Ω∆+=∆        A.93 
or equivalently 
( ) ( ) ( )ρσσρ β wtttwt R 11111 +−++ ∆Ω+=∆          A.94 
rearranging gives 
( ) ( )
ρ
σσ
ρ β ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∆
∆Ω−=∆
+−
++ w
t
w
t
ttw
t
R 11111
1         A.95 
denoting 
ρ
π ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∆= tt
1  and 
ρ
π ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∆= ++ 11
1
t
t respectively finally results in  
1
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t
ttt R π
πβπ σσ          A.96 
Proof of Remark 3.8: 
Recall rtttt
r
t ARC πε=  and )( twtttwt HARC += π  and define trtt AA≡λ  and twtt AA≡− λ1 . 
Summing up rtC  and 
w
tC  gives 
( )[ ]tttttttttt HARARC +−+= λλεπ 1         A.97 
and rearranging finally yields 
[ ]{ }ttttttt HARC +−+= λεπ )1(1          A.98 
 
Proof of Remark 3.9: 
Retirees’ assets accumulate by the savings of current retirees at time t as well as by the 
savings of those workers who retire from t to t+1. Thus  
( )[ ]wtttttrtttttt CWARCARA −+−−+−=++ λωλλ 1)1(11         A.99 
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The amount of assets held by workers at time t+1 equals the amount of assets carried by 
workers from t to t+1 time the fraction of those staying in the labour force ω. This implies 
( ) ( ) 111 1 +++ −==−+ ttwtwtttwt AACWRA λω                   A.100 
Thus 
( ) ( ) 1111 ++−=−+ ttwtttwt ACWRA λω                    A.101 
Recall also that rtttt
r
t ARC πε=  
( ) ( ) ωλωλεπλ
11)1(1 111 +++ −−+−= ttttttt AARA                  A.102 
rearranging gives finally 
)1()1(
1
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+
t
t
ttttt A
A
R                   A.103 
Proof of Remark 3.10: 
In the steady state the all quantitative variables grow at the exogenously given growth rate of 
the effective labour force XtNt which equals (1+x)(1+n) which is approximately equal to 
(1+x+n) (see Gertler, page 74). Therefore the normalization to output is convenient. Denote 
t
t
t Y
K
k =  and 
t
t
t Y
H
h = . 
(i) For the first equation use 
tttt KCYK )1(1 δ−+−=+                         A.104 
dividing by ( ) tt YnxY ++=+ 11  and using the definition for Ct and Kt=At 
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( )[ ]{ }
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tttttt
t knxYnx
HKR
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−+++
+−+−++=+ 1
)1(
1
11
1
1
1
δλεπ                    A.105 
rearranging and using the fact that in the steady state kt=kt+1  
( ) ( )[ ]{ }hRkknx +−+−=++ λεπδ 111                   A.106 
(ii) Use Kt=At and the result from 3.25 in 
)1()1(
1
1 ωλπεωλ −+−=
+
+
t
t
ttttt A
A
R                   A.107 
yielding  
)1()(
1
1
11 ωλγβωλ σσ −+=
+
−
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t
t
tttt K
K
RR                  A.108 
expressing K in terms of k gives 
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RR tttt                  A.109 
As the economy is in its steady state  
( ) )1(1
1)(1 ωβωγλ σσ −=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++− nxR                 A.110 
augmenting by the ratio of retirees to workers γ
ω
−+
−=Ψ
n1
1  and rearranging gives finally  
σβγω
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nnx
−++
−+++=                   A.111 
(iii) Using Definition 3.3 
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ttt Rn
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WNH                  A.112 
and dividing by Yt+1 
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rearranging 
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setting ht=ht+1 
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solving for h gives 
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which finally gives 
( ) ( )ΩΓ++−= ,1 RxnR
Rh α                      A.118 
Equations (iv)-(vii) follow by simply setting t=t+1 in the corresponding equations 3.39, 3.31, 
3.25, and 3.28. 
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4. Age-dependent mortality (Li and Tuljapurkar) 
That mortality and fertility rates in industrialized countries are declining and thereby leading 
to significant changes in the population’s age composition is a well known fact. As an 
example Figure 4.1 shows the increasing cohort life expectancy for the US between 1900 and 
2060. Decreasing old-age mortality leads to a shift in the expected lifespan while the 
reduction of fertility rates causes a further reduction of the relative share of young people in 
the population. In total these two effects cause demographic population ageing. This so far is 
straightforward. For economic analysis demographic aging can have strong implications. 
Viewing the models presented in the thesis so far, one has to admit, that their approach of age-
independent mortality lacks realism. Constant death rates, implying age-independency of 
mortality, can simply not take account of changes in mortality and thus do not allow for 
demographic aging to enter the framework. That taking account of demographic aging in 
economic analysis has important implications is shown by Li and Tuljapurkar (2004). They 
find significant effects on several economic variables when including age-dependent mortality 
into their framework.  
 
Figure 4.1 Cohort life expectancy in the US (Li, Tuljapurkar; page 1)  
 
4.1 Incorporating the distribution function of age at death 
 
The following section discusses the age-dependent mortality approach of Li and Tuljapurkar 
(2004). The main feature of their framework is the implementation of a distribution function 
of age at death to a continuous time OLG model. Doing so, the authors find significant 
implications of changes in life expectancy on economic outcomes. Besides increasing life 
expectancy, they pay particular attention to the effect of decreasing uncertainty in the timing 
of death which they find to have important impacts on resulting economic magnitudes. The 
observed relationship between those two effects is almost linear (Li and Tuljapurkar (2004), 
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page 6). Thus, as life expectancy increases the uncertainty of lifetime decreases almost 
linearly. Decreasing life time uncertainty has again strong implications on agents’ behaviour 
within the economy. Li and Tuljapurkar try to account for both effects by incorporating a 
distribution function of the age at death to the framework of a continuous time OLG model. 
Changes in life expectancy can then be represented by a shift in the first moment (the mean) 
of the distribution function of age at death, whereas a decrease in life time uncertainty can be 
seen as decreasing the variance of this distribution function. In this sense demographic ageing 
in industrialized countries can be seen as leading to a tightening of the distribution function of 
death age. Figure 4.2 shows this tightening of the “death age” distribution for the US 
between 1950 and 2010. 
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution function of age at death in 1950 and 2010 for the US (Li, Tuljapurkar; page 5) 
Both effects are clearly apparent in the graph – increased life expectancy shifts the 
distribution’s mean to the right whereas reduced life time uncertainty can be seen as the 
reduction of the distribution’s standard deviation. The distribution’s shape also suggests that 
using a normal distribution will attain a close approximation of real mortality. 
Li and Tuljapurkar also examine the effects of increasing life expectancy on schooling and 
retirement decisions (see section 4.3). The argument for paying attention to impact of changes 
in life expectancy on schooling tenure is that an increased life time horizon is likely to affect 
individuals’ decisions to invest in their own human capital in order to receive higher future 
wages. To account for the effect of schooling on individuals’ human capital, wages are 
defined as an increasing function of the schooling tenure (see Definition 4.1). The intuition 
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behind this definition is, that the longer the schooling tenure, the higher the individual’s 
labour productivity and therefore the higher the individual’s wage. 
In contrast to previous models Li and Tuljapurkar work with a distribution function of the 
random variable death-age. This is defined as follows 
 
Remark 4.1: 
At time z let ( )zs,µ  be the instantaneous death-rate at age s and survivorship rate ( )zsl ,  be 
the probability that an individual born at time s will be alive at time z. The random variable 
death-age is denoted by T. Then the density function of T - ( )zs,φ  - is given by the product 
( ) ( )zslzs ,, ⋅µ . 
 
One important feature of OLG models lies in aggregation patterns. Even though aggregation 
seems to become a difficult task when using a distribution function instead of simpler 
approaches (as in Blanchard’s framework) the following result simplifies matters a great deal.  
 
Proposition 4.1: 
Aggregate variables can be derived as the expectation over the distribution function of the 
random variable “death age” T as defined in definition 4.1. 
 
Proof: see Appendix B  
 
Based on Blanchard’s OLG framework (compare section 3.2), Li and Tuljapurkar incorporate 
the distribution of death age into a continuous time OLG model. Compared to Blanchard’s 
model the constant probability of death is replaced by the age-dependent survival probability. 
As in Blanchard’s model agents maximize their expected utility from consumption in the 
presence of life time uncertainty 
( ) ( )( )∫∞ −−⋅⋅−
t
tz dzezcutzl )(θ .         (4.1) 
The utility function is assumed as a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function with 
the relative risk aversion coefficient γ. In equation 4.1 θ denotes individual’s rate of time 
preference. The economy is assumed to follow a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
production factors capital und human capital 
αα −= 1HAKY .          (4.2) 
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Definition 4.1: 
Relative wages are defined as  
( ) )( safs weay =           (4.3) 
 
Relative wages depend on the years of schooling (as) chosen by individuals. As in 
Blanchard’s model, a redistributing life insurance company solves the optimal behaviour 
problems implied by uncertain life time (compare section 3.2.1.1).  
Solving the utility maximization problem yields very unhandy and complicated expressions. 
Therefore the results are not given in the text. As I will not discuss the results of the 
maximization problem I present only a short description of the derivation process in Appendix 
B. The following section summarizes Li and Tuljaprukar’s findings of changes in the mean 
and the variance of death-age on various economic variables. For their analysis the authors 
make the following assumption 
 
Assumption 4.1: 
The random variable death-age is normally distributed and θ=0.03, α=0.03, γ=1 and 
maximum age is set to Tmax=12025. Further, total human capital is constant. 
 
4.2 Effects of changing life expectancy and life time uncertainty 
 
Effect of changing life expectancy 
To analyze the effects of changing life expectancy on the economy, the variance of death age 
is initially held constant. At this stage of the analysis, neither retirement aspects nor schooling 
decisions are considered. Thus, agents work for their entire life. In this set-up Li and 
Tuljapurkar find, that increasing life expectancy will increase aggregate wealth. This result 
rests on  
 
Assumption 4.2:  
Individual net assets increase with high age and thus people of high age posses more assets 
than very young people. 
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This can be seen as follows. Individual wealth does not necessarily increase monotonically 
through life, but in the long run the existence of life insurance implies a tendency for 
individual assets to increase with age. At high age, they argue, individual assets will 
eventually increase due to the existence of the insurance company (see Li and Tuljapurkar, 
page 10). Now, as population ages - due to increased life expectancy and the fact that fertility 
is adjusted in order to keep the population size constant (see assumption 4.1) – there are more 
people of old age who each posses more assets than very young people. Thus, as a 
consequence economy wide assets – wealth – increase with increasing life expectancy. Figure 
B4.1 in Appendix B at the end of section 4 shows surface plots indicating the behaviour of 
diverse economic variables with respect to changes in life expectancy and death-age variance. 
Wage changes in the same direction as life expectancy while the interest rate develops in the 
opposite direction.  
Consumption behaviour is quite similar to the development of wealth. Individual consumption 
increases with life expectancy as well as individual life-time labour income. Again, as 
population ages due to increased life expectancy, aggregate consumption and labour income 
increase. The first line in table 4.1 (below) summarizes these findings.  
 
Effects of changing death age variance 
To study the “pure” effect of changing death-age variance, life expectancy is now held 
constant. How does a changing death-age variance affect the economy, conditional on 
constant life expectancy? Following proposition is fundamental for analyzing the effects of 
changing death-age variance 
 
Remark 4.2: 
As the variance of death-age increases more people reach very high ages while more people 
die at young ages. Thus, increasing variance of death-age leads to a higher share of “extreme” 
death-age cases in the population.  
  
As with changes in life expectancy, Li and Tuljapurkar find that aggregate wealth will change 
in the same direction as the variance of death-age. This can be seen clearly by considering the 
previous proposition. Increasing variance implies an increasing probability of death at young 
                                                                                                                                                        
25 Li and Tuljapurkar choose these parameter values according to the work of Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil 
(2000) for comparability. 
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age. As more people die at young age, less young people contribute to total wealth. On the 
other hand increasing variance also implies that more people reach a very high age. As those 
very old people possess much more assets (see assumption 4.2) compared to the very young 
likewise facing high mortality, the “gain” in total wealth by the increase in very old people 
offsets the loss by the very young. Thus, total wealth will increase as variance of death age 
increases.  
Consumption shows the same response to increasing variance as in the case of increasing life 
expectancy. As the variance increases, wage increases and the interest rate decreases. To keep 
the balance between life-time income and life-time consumption, individual consumption 
must rise. Increasing variance increases the percentage of old people in the economy, leading 
to a total increase in consumption. Line 2 of Table 4.1 summarizes the effects of changing 
variance on diverse variables according to Li and Tuljapurkar’s findings (see also Figure B4.1 
in the Appendix B).  
 
  Initial cons. agg. cons. agg. wealth interest rate  wage 
increasing life 
expectancy Inc. inc. incr. dec. incr. 
Decreasing 
variance of 
death age 
dec. dec. dec. inc dec. 
 Table 4.1: Changes in variables when life expectancy or the variance of death age change  
Joint effects 
The previous analysis shows the behaviour of diverse economic variables when affected by 
changes either in life expectancy or the variance of death-age. To see the implications of joint 
changes in both – life expectancy and the variance of death-age – Li and Tuljapurkar first take 
a look at the behaviour of the interest rate. The previous sections showed that the interest rate 
is an increasing function of life expectancy and a decreasing function of the variance of death-
age. Note, that  
 
Remark 4.3: 
The assumption of a constant and therefore age-independent life expectancy implies that the 
variance of death-age 200 ev = .  
 
Remark 4.3 again implies that in the case of constant mortality the variance of death-age 
increases with life expectancy which stands in contrast to what is observed for countries like 
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the US where increasing life expectancy is accompanied by decreasing variance of death-age. 
As shown in table 4.1 decreasing life time uncertainty works as an opposing force to the 
effects of increasing life expectancy. Taking both effects into account results in a much higher 
interest rate than in the case of constant death rate (see table 4.2 and figure 4.3). Following the 
same argument, initial and total consumption are lower when using age-dependent mortality 
than using a constant death rate. Here decreasing variance in the death-age works to reduce 
the magnitudes (see table 4.2 and figure 4.3).  
Comparing different modellations of mortality 
This section compares the implications of the age-dependent mortality framework on diverse 
economic variables with those implied by other mortality assumptions. These alternative 
assumptions are: a constant mortality approach as in Blanchard’s Model, fixed death-age as in 
the Diamond Model, normal distribution of mortality as assumed by Li and Tuljapurkar and a 
distribution fitted to real data.  
 
Figure 4.3 Effects from increasing life expectancy on diverse economic variables  
(Li, Tuljapurkar; page 14) 
 
Figure 4.3 plots the comparative statics of the interest rate, initial consumption, consumption, 
wage and wealth when life expectancy changes under different mortality assumptions. Table 
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4.226 lists the numerical results obtained by Li and Tuljapurkar. As can be seen in the figure 
and the table the normality assumption gives a good image of the real data, whereas the 
constant death rate clearly overestimates wealth, consumption and wage while 
underestimating the interest rate.  
 
Table 4.2 Comparing results from different mortality assumptions (Li, Tuljapurkar; page 15) 
 
Li and Tuljapurkar argue that these differences come from the different assumptions made on 
the variance of death-age (compare Li and Tuljapurkar, page 14). As shown in table 4.1 
decreasing variance of death age causes an increase of the interest rate. Therefore the resulting 
interest rate is much higher in the case of normal distributed mortality compared to constant 
death rates (compare Remark 4.3). Table 4.2 confirms the impression of figure 4.3 that the 
normal distribution assumption yields a very close approximation to the fitted data and thus a 
close estimate on real data.  
4.3 The impact of changing life expectancy on schooling and the 
effect of compulsory retirement  
Li and Tuljapurkar examine the effects of increasing life expectancy on schooling decisions. 
The argument for paying attention to the impact of changes in life expectancy on schooling 
tenure is that an increased life time horizon is likely to affect individuals’ decisions to invest 
in their own human capital in order to receive higher future wages. To take account of the 
effect of schooling on individuals’ human capital, wages are defined as an increasing function 
of the schooling tenure (compare definition 4.1). The intuition behind this definition is, that 
the longer the schooling tenure is, the higher is the individual’s labour productivity and 
therefore the higher the individual’s wage. Additionally attention is paid to the impact of 
retirement age on individuals’ schooling decisions. 
                                                 
26 In the table H denotes aggregate human capital, r the interest rate, w the wage, K aggregate capital, c(0) the 
initial consumption and C aggregate consumption. H is assumed constant and therefore set to 100. Life 
expectancy (e0) is set to 79,83 years (see Li and Tuljapurkar, page 15). 
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Schooling without retirement 
To study the effect of changes in life expectancy on an agent’s schooling decision, one first 
has to specify the effect of the schooling tenure on income. Labour income is defined as an 
increasing function of schooling years as (see definition 4.1). Thus, as agents choose to 
increase their schooling tenure, they will receive higher wages in future. The productivity 
term f(as) is defined as increasing function of schooling years 
 
Definition 4.2:  
The productivity term determining the relationship between schooling years and wage is 
defined as  
Ψ−
Ψ−
Θ= 1
1
)( ss aaf   
where Θ=0,32 and Ψ=0,5827.  
Effect from introducing schooling 
Introducing schooling into the framework affects human capital. In contrast to the former 
analysis total human capital is not constant anymore.  
On the one hand the introduction of schooling affects human capital directly by reducing the 
working tenure from the whole life span by several years28. On the other hand the length of 
schooling-life increases labour productivity and thereby efficient labour (the more years of 
schooling are chosen, the higher the function f(as) implying higher labour productivity and 
wages). The more efficient labour is, the higher is total human capital. Thus, there are two 
opposing effects of schooling on human capital. These two effects oppose each other, and 
thus it is not clear if increasing as yields an increase or a decrease of total human capital in the 
first place. Yet, Li and Tuljaprukar find in their calibration that the overall effect is an 
increase in total human capital (Li and Tuljapurkar, page 19).  
 
Effect of increasing life expectancy with schooling 
Li and Tuljapurkar find a positive relationship between increasing life expectancy and 
schooling tenure – being in line with other researchers’ results (e.g. the studies of Boucekkine, 
de la Croix and Licandro (2002) and of Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000); see Li and 
                                                 
27 These values are chosen to allow for comparison with results of Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil(2000). 
28 Notice, that at this point, retirement is not yet considered. Thus, before introducing schooling agents where 
working for their entire life. The next subsection will examine the effects from introducing retirement to the 
framework. 
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Tuljapurkar, page 19). As they point out, the difference to the study of Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder 
and Weil (assuming a constant death rate!) is that the steady schooling tenure is much lower 
(6 or 7 years). This, they argue is due to the negative effects of the variance of death age (see 
again page 19). As for other magnitudes (compare table 4.1) the decrease in life time 
uncertainty opposes the dynamics implied by increasing life expectancy.   
Most apparent are the effects of introducing schooling to the framework on the behaviour of 
the interest rate. As figure 4.4 shows, the interest rate first increases and then starts to 
decrease as life expectancy increases – contrasting the previously discussed case without 
schooling. The interest rate increases until life expectancy reaches a median level but starts to 
decrease as life expectancy reaches very high levels. The argument for this initial increase is, 
that “at median life expectancy [...] the variance of death-age decreases dramatically” and “it 
seems that schooling increases the effect of the variance of death-age” (Li and Tuljapurkar, 
p. 20).  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Effect of increasing life expectancy on the interest rate with schooling  
(Li, Tuljapurkar; page 18) 
4.4 Effect of retirement 
To examine the effects of changing life expectancy in the framework including schooling and 
retirement aspects, first just the pure retirement effect is considered. This means, that 
schooling tenure is first held constant and only the age of retirement is changed. The second 
part of this subsection will then examine the joint effects, when agents are able to choose their 
optimal schooling tenure - also facing compulsory retirement age. 
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The pure retirement effect: 
If schooling tenure is held constant, the introduction of retirement works as a reduction in 
total human capital. This reduction in human capital again reflects the reduction in the total 
labour force that occurs due to the shortening of agents’ working life time by the introduction 
of a compulsory retirement age. Figure 4.5 shows the behaviour of diverse economic variables 
with different retirement ages. The interest rate, total wealth, total consumption and total 
labour (human capital) decreases as retirement age decreases. Wages and initial consumption 
on the other hand are found to be increasing with a reduction in the retirement age.  
 
Retirement and schooling: 
Combining both life cycle aspects – schooling and retirement – the following figure shows the 
results of Li and Tuljapurkars simulations. The effect of changing retirement age on schooling 
decisions is found to be negative – the higher the retirement age is set the lower agents choose 
their schooling tenure (see figure 4.5). This reflects the desire to earn higher wages, the longer 
the expected retirement period is. Confronted with long retirement periods individuals choose 
to invest more into their human capital in order to earn higher wages and so to finance their 
consumption during retirement.  
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Figure 4.5 Effects from increasing life expectancy with schooling and retirement  
(Li, Tujlapurkar; page 23) 
The figure shows that the reduction of retirement age increases schooling, wage and initial 
consumption while reducing the interest rate, total wealth, total consumption and of course 
total human capital. It seems that as life expectancy increases the effect of reducing the 
retirement age becomes more significant for the interest rate, consumption (initial and total), 
wage and human capital. Intuitively, increasing life expectancy makes retirement effects more 
severe, as more people are concerned.  
4.5 Life cycle aspects of the model 
By incorporating the distribution function of death-age Li and Tuljapurkar create a model 
yielding a high degree of demographic realism. This age-dependent mortality framework is 
able to take account of the changing age structure of the economy’s population which is a 
clear improvement compared to age-independent mortality frameworks previously discussed. 
As has been shown before, assuming mortality to be constant through time and thus 
independent of age leads to age-independent consumption behaviour. Contrasting this 
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unsatisfying result this framework yields changing consumption behaviour as people grow 
older. 
In total the results drawn from the simulations based on their model Li and Tuljapurkar find 
realistic and important impacts of changing life expectancy and decreasing life time 
uncertainty on consumption behaviour.  
In paying attention also to the impact of increasing life expectancy on individual’s schooling 
decisions the authors achieve an even higher degree of demographic realism. Concerning the 
economy as a whole extended schooling tenure due to increasing life expectancy increases  
total human capital available to the economy. On the other hand the impact of compulsory 
retirement age is to reduce available total human capital. Therefore studying the response of 
schooling decisions when agents face increasing life expectancy and decreasing life time 
uncertainty is an important issue. As Li and Tuljapurkar show, paying attention to altering 
schooling tenure together with the consideration of the effect of compulsory retirement age 
has significant impacts on resulting economic magnitudes. 
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Appendix B 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.1(taken from Li and Tuljapurkar, page 4): 
Let φ(x) be the distribution function of death age T. Age-dependent survival curve l(a) is  
( ) ( )∫∞=
a
dttal φ            (B1) 
The aggregate of some function j(a) of age a is defined with respect to survivorship 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫∫ ∞ ∞∞ ==
00 x
dtdxtxjdxxlxjJ φ         (B2) 
Changing the order of integration this turns into 
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡== ∫∫ ∫∞ TTt dxxjEdttdxxjJ
00 0
φ         (B3) 
Thus, the aggregate of a variable j(a) can be expressed in terms of the expectation over the 
distribution of death-age T.  
Agents’ maximization problem (taken from Li and Tuljapurkar, p. 7): 
As the concrete maximization problem is not discussed in my thesis I just give a short 
overview of the derivation process. First notice useful definitions: 
 
Definition B.1: 
( ) [ ]zTT eEzg ≡            (B4) 
( ) ( )[ ]saTzT eEzP ∧≡           (B5) 
( ) ( )[ ]raTzT eEzQ ∧≡           (B6) 
( ) [ ]aTEa T ∧≡λ           (B7) 
 
Consumption: 
The standard optimality conditions yield an optimal individual lifetime consumption path c(a) 
(see Li and Tuljapurkar, page 8) 
( ) ( )kacac exp0=           (B8) 
where  
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γ
θ−≡ rk            (B9) 
The household’s budget constraint requires that the present value of consumption has to be 
equal to the present value of lifetime earnings (see Romer, page 41), taking into account 
lifetime uncertainty. Reconsidering the fact that the aggregate of a variable can be expressed 
in terms of the expectation over the random variable death-age (see Proposition 4.1) this 
yields 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∧−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ − ∫∫ TTTT daaTrasfwEdaraacE
00
expexpexp     (B10) 
 
The left hand side of the equation gives 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]
rk
TrkEcdaarkEcdaraacE T
T
T
T
T −−−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ − ∫∫ 11expexpexp 0
0
0
0
  (B11) 
 
For the right hand side notice that the expression can be separated (see Li and Tuljapurkar, 
page 26) in the sense that 
( )( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
rr aTrTaTTrT
zaEzTEaTzE ≥< +=∧ 1exp1expexp      (B12) 
 
Using this yields for the right hand side of equation B.10 yields 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )
( )( )[ ]
( ) r
aTrEaTrEafw
daraEafw
rP
sT
rQ
rTs
aT
aT
Ts
r
s
−⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∧−−∧−
=
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −
−−
∧
∧
∫
1expexpexp
expexp
444 3444 21444 3444 21
    (B13) 
 
Equating these results (B.11 and B.13) gives finally consumption at birth as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1
exp
0 −−
−−−−=
rkg
rQrP
r
afwrkc s        (B14) 
 
C0 thus depends on as, the amount of years of schooling. The optimal schooling tenure 
follows as the derivative of (B14) w.r.t. as as 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 0=−+−−−′
s
s da
rdPrQrPaf         (B15) 
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Aggregate consumption follows by using the expectation for aggregation as  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
k
kTEbNcdakaEbNc
dakacbNEdaacbNEtC
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
11expexp
exp
0
0
0
0
0
0
−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
∫
∫∫
      (B16) 
where b refers to the birth rate and N to the size of the population. This finally gives 
( ) ( )( )110 −= kgkbNctC          (B17) 
Capital and human capital 
To derive aggregate wealth first define to evolution of individuals’ net assets as 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )acayavar
da
adv −++= µ          (B18) 
 
Notice that v(0)=0. Further, from equation 4.3, 
( ) ( ) ( )( )safwawhay exp==          (B19)  
 
Solving this first order differential equation yields (see Li and Tuljapurkar, page 28) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )∫ ∫∫ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−
a xa
dxdmmrxcxydmmrav
0 00
expexp µµ     (B20) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )∫ −−=
a
dxxlrxxcxy
al
raav
0
expexp       (B21) 
 
Therefore aggregate wealth K(t) follows as 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∫ ∫∫ T xTTT dxdaalraacayxl rxbNEdxxvbNEtK 0 00 exp
exp   (B22) 
By the definition of expectation this becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )∫ ∫ −−= max
0 0
expexp
T x
dadxalraacayrxbNtK      (B23) 
exchanging the order of integration yields 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫−−= max
0
max
expexp
T T
a
dxdarxalraacaybNtK      (B24) 
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and further 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )[ ]∫ −−−= max
0
max 1exp
T
daaTralacay
r
bNtK      (B25) 
We can also write this in expectation form  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−= ∫TT daaTracayErbNtK 0 max 1exp      (B26) 
 
Defining  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−≡ ∫TT daaTracayEwer 0 max00 1exp
1,, σφ      (B27) 
 
this reduces to a simpler expression for aggregate wealth as 
( ) ( )00 ,, σφ erwr
bNtK =          (B28) 
 
Substituting the income y(a) into B27 gives 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −−−+
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −−−+
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ −−−≡
∫
∫
∫
∧
∧
∧
∧
T
aT
T
aT
aT
T
aT
T
r
r
s
s
daaTracayE
w
daaTracayE
w
daaTracE
w
er
1exp1
1exp1
1exp1,,
max
max
0
max00 σφ
     (B29) 
 
Further calculation yields an expression for φ as (see Li and Tuljapurkar, page 29) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )0000 ,,exp,, σϕσφ erafer s=         (B30) 
 
where 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )sr aarkg
kgrPrQ
kr
krer λλσϕ +−−−
−−−−−=
1
1,, 00     (B31) 
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Finally it results that aggregate capital (aggregate wealth) can be expressed as 
( ) ( )( ) ( )00 ,,exp σϕ erafwr
bNtK s=         (B32) 
 
Aggregate human capital follows from the definition of relative wages simply as  
( )( )Laf sexp            (B33) 
where L refers to the size of the workforce between ages as and ar. 
 
Expressed alternatively, human capital follows as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]srs aaafbNtH λλ −= exp         (B34) 
 
Dividing B32 by B34 and using the first order conditions of the production function (equation 
4.2) yields the equation  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
α
λλ
−
+=−−
−−−−−
11
1 sr aa
rkg
kgrPrQ
kr
kr        (B35) 
 
By solving equations B35 and B15 we can find age of schooling and equilibrium interest rate 
r. All other variables can be found accordingly (see Li and Tuljaprukar, page 9).  
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Surface plots  
Of the interest rate, consumption, wage and wealth with respect to changes in life expectancy 
and the variance of death-age. 
 
 
 
Figure B4.1 Surface plots of changing life expectancy and life time uncertainty on diverse economic 
variables (Li, Tuljapurkar; page 11) 
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5. Probabilistic Aging (Grafenhofer et al.) 
The core principle of the PA model is its alternative way of thinking about ageing. Instead of 
defining age in the usual way simply as time that has passed since birth, ageing is viewed as a 
stochastic process, moving agents from one stage of life to the next. Life stages differ in 
diverse characteristics such as labour productivity, health and mortality defining individual’s 
economic abilities. Agents within the same life stage – i.e. age-group or age-class - face the 
same characteristics. The transition from one stage to the next can be seen as an ageing-shock. 
Just as in Gertler´s model of retirees and workers the randomness of transition implies that 
people within the same stage of life can differ in actual age, i.e. their date of birth.  
By modelling ageing as a stochastic transition through several stages of life, the authors try to 
take into account that in real life people seem to “age” at different speed. For example through 
their individual history of illness or accidents people of same age differ in health, which in 
turn affects their mortality and labour productivity. Thus, people of same “age” can have a 
quite different status of health and vitality, due to their personal life cycle history.  
In the PA framework ageing is no longer viewed as a monotonous and smooth process, but as 
discrete events, ageing shocks, that occur stochastically and change individual’s life cycle 
characteristics. While some people seem to stay younger for a longer period of time, others 
are hit by ageing shocks more frequently and thus age at higher speed. 
To be able to capture the different speed of ageing among individuals, a discrete number of A 
states of increasing age are defined. Ageing in this context means, that people move from one 
state of life to the next. As the transition from one state to the next occurs stochastically, the 
framework allows for different people staying in a specific state of life for varying length of 
time. In this set-up people born at the same time can reach different stages of their life cycle at 
different points in time. People within the same stage of their lifecycle – or equivalently of 
same “age” – on the other side, can differ concerning the time when they were born. As a 
result the PA framework yields a very high degree of heterogeneity among agents within the 
economy.  
In the PA model diverse characteristic variables like an agent’s earnings potential as well as 
mortality risk differ across different age-groups and are thus age-group specific. Contrasting 
age-group dependent characteristics like mortality, some other variables depend on the 
individual’s personal life cycle. For example the amount of assets, or more generally his/her 
wealth, an agent has accumulated over time, is dependent on the agents individual lifecycle 
history. If, for example, an agent managed to stay in a very productive state of life for a long 
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time s/he will probably have accumulated more capital than an agent who aged very fast and 
so could not earn – and thus save - as much. Therefore a concept is needed, that can capture 
these agent-dependent issues as well as those entirely determined by the agent’s position in 
the life cycle.   
5.1 The concept of lifecycle histories 
In order to be able to make allowance for heterogeneous ageing the initial task is to 
distinguish real time from the ageing-process. The PA’s framework rests on a discrete number 
of A ageing states. As previously mentioned, diverse characteristics are solely determined by 
the agent’s age-group affiliation, such as his/her earnings potentials. When an agent of age-
group a is hit by an ageing shock s/he moves from this state a to a+1, implying a change in 
these characteristics.   
 
Definition 5.1: 
The life cycle history (life cycle biography) is the collection of the dates of ageing shocks that 
already hit an agent and is represented by a vector α. The entries of this vector are the dates at 
which the ageing shocks occurred. 
 
Besides their date of birth, agents differ by their individual life cycle history, as they “age” at 
different speed. For a household of age-group a the number of possible lifecycle histories thus 
is given by 
( ){ }taaat ≤<<≡Β αααα ...:,..., 11   
As soon as an agent experiences an ageing shock his/her lifecycle biography is updated by the 
entry of the date of ageing.  
 
Assumption 5.1: 
All economic agents with the same life cycle history α are viewed as being identical.  
 
Having the same life cycle history implies that agents have experienced exactly the same age-
group specific characteristics for exactly the same length of time. Thus, they have been 
earning the same amount of money and saved the same proportion of their income (because 
this economic behaviour is determined by age-group affiliation!). Thus, concerning economic 
relevance, they represent the same type of agents and therefore can be viewed as being 
identical. This feature will make aggregation quite easy.  
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5.2 Demographics of the PA Model 
Agents face the risk of ageing as well as the risk of dying. Thus, from time-period t to t+1, 
there are three possible events for each agent. With probability 1-γa s/he dies (note, that the 
superscript a indicates age-group specifity of a parameter). With probability γaωa s/he 
survives without ageing. With probability γa (1- ωa ) s/he survives but ages and thus belongs to 
the age-group a+1 in the next period. This of course is different for agents of the last age-
group. They can survive with probability γA or die with probability 1-γA. These probabilities, 
for survivorship and death, differ between different age-groups. Thus mortality and ageing are 
modelled age-group specific.  
Concerning issues of savings and other variables the individual lifecycle history is important. 
In order to be able to aggregate identical agents one must collect agents who are at time t in 
the same age-group a and also have the same lifecycle history α. Such a group of identical 
agents is then denoted by a tN ,α . From time t to t+1 an age-group a is divided into three 
subgroups (again due to the “law of large numbers”), reflecting the three scenarios mentioned 
above (see Remark 5.1): (i) into a group of those dying, (ii)those surviving without ageing and 
(iii) those who age from time t to t+1. Since ageing in the last case implies a change in the life 
cycle history (the agents are hit by an ageing shock, thus their life cycle biographies must be 
updated), the new lifecycle history for the corresponding group is then denoted by α´. 
 
Remark 5.1 
From time t to t+1 age-group a is divided into the following three subgroups: 
(i) )1(*,
*
*
aa
tNN γαα −=   dying (denoted by the superscript *) 
(ii) aaa t
a
t NN ωγαα *,1, =+   no aging     (5.1) 
(iii) )1(*,
1
1´,
aaa
t
a
t NN ωγαα −=+ +  aging 
Proof: see Appendix C  
 
As agents with the same lifecycle biography α are viewed as being identical, a particular age-
group consists of a tN ,α  identical agents at time t. Summing up over all possible lifecycle 
histories at time t within a specific age-group a yields the total number of agents within age-
group a as 
∑
Β∈
≡
a
t
a
t
a
t NN
α
α , .         (5.2) 
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Thus, this aggregation formula collects all agents that have ended up at time t to be in age-
group a, regardless of their individual date of birth. As mortality and ageing probabilities are 
identical for all agents within the same age-group, the law of large numbers implies how age-
groups develop over time. In particular the law of large numbers implies a deterministic 
behaviour for the evolution of age-groups. The number of newborns in period t+1 is denoted 
by 1 1),1( ++ ttN . The evolution of age-groups is given by 
 
Remark 5.2: 
Age-groups develop according to following three equations: 
(i) 1111 *)1(*
−−−
+ −+= ataaataaat NNN ωγωγ  ,  ωA = 1, 
(ii) 1 1),1(
1111
1 * +++ += tttt NNN ωγ        (5.3) 
(iii) ∑
=
+++ −−+=
A
a
a
t
a
tttt NNNN
1
1
1),1(1 )1( γ  , ∑
=
≡
A
a
a
tt NN
1
 
Proof: see Appendix C 
5.3 Consumption and Saving 
As in Gertler’s model agents value their current state according to a CES – non expected 
utility function (compare equation (3.21) in section 3). Again the argument for this is that 
assuming this kind of preferences restricts agents to risk-neutrality in the presence of income 
risk but allows for an arbitrary intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Thus, agents are able to 
value current consumption at a different level than future consumption. Income risk occurs 
here, as the risk of switching from one age-group to the next also implies a change in labour 
income. This is due to the fact, that earnings potentials are assumed to be age-group specific. 
The difference to Gertler’s model is that every age-group faces the risk of dying.  
5.3.1 Individual consumption 
An individual maximizes his/her expected future utility arising from consumption. The 
maximization problem yields the following Bellman equation   
( ) ( )[ ]ραραα βγ
α
a
t
aa
t
C
a
t VCAV a
t
1,,,
,
max)( ++=       (5.4) 
Thus, the value function – dependent on current assets held by the agent – is defined as the 
maximum over a function of current consumption and discounted future expected utility 
a
tV 1, +α . The discount factor consists of an exogenous factor β augmented by γ
a, the probability 
of death for the age-group. Conditional on surviving, an agent’s expected utility next period is 
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1
1,'1,1, )1(
+
+++ −+= a taataat VVV ααα ωω          (5.5) 
Thus, equation (5.5) is the mean over the value function in both possible future states. As 
agent’s consumption possibilities depend not only on his/her current wage but also on the 
assets accumulated by the agent, one has to take a look at how assets evolve over time.  
5.3.1.1 Individual’s wage and assets 
Clearly the accumulation of capital depends on the individual agent’s life cycle history, as 
mentioned before. The longer an agent remains in highly productive states of life, the more 
labour income s/he earns, and is therefore able to accumulate more capital. Labour income is 
assumed to be group specific and equal for all agents within the same age-group.  
 
Definition 5.2: 
Wage is defined by the age-group specific productivity characteristic θa and takes the form 
⎩⎨
⎧ −=
t
a
tta
t p
w
y
θτ )1(
 
{ }
{ }.,...:
1,...,1:
Aaa
aa
R
R
∈
−∈
       (5.6) 
 
This formulation captures the different wage profiles for different age-groups. Group specific 
labour income depends on the factor of productivity atθ  which differs among different age-
groups, leading to changing earnings between different groups. Labour income is earned as 
long as people remain part of the labour force. Thus, they receive labour income until they 
move to the first stage of retirement Ra . Workers finance the social security system by paying 
taxes on labour income τ. As soon as people retire they receive pension payments p.  
As in Blanchard’s and Gertler’s models the possibility of dying leads to an optimality 
problem (compare section 3.2.1.1). Again the introduction of a redistributing life insurance 
company helps to solve the problem of uncertain lifetime. Agents receive insurance payments 
from the company contingent on the bequests they could leave behind unintended when 
dying. This leads in total to  
 
Remark 5.3: 
Let γ denote age-group specific insurance payments. The asset accumulation equation for 
agents is given by 
[ ]a tata tta ta CyARA ,,11, αααγ −+= ++ , 1 1,'1, + ++ = a ta t AA αα .    (5.7) 
Proof: see Appendix C  
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The equation on the right hand side states simply, that the value of a persons assets is the 
same in period t+1 whether she ages (represented by the right hand side of the equation – in 
this case the life cycle biography is updated to α’ and age-group affiliation is then a+1) or not 
(represented by the left hand side of the equation - life cycle biography remains α and age 
group index remains a). 
5.3.1.2 Optimality conditions 
 
Optimality Conditions: 
Solving the agent’s maximization problem yields necessary optimality conditions  
( ) atta t RC 1,11, ++− = αρα ηβ ,  and  a tta t R 1,1, ++= αα ηβη     (5.8) 
where  
( ) 1,
,
,
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t
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t VdA
dV
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+
+
+ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
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α
α
α ωωη ata
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t
a
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t VdA
dV
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. (5.9) 
 
The Euler equation for agent’s consumption follows as 
( ) a ta tta ta taa ta CRCC ,1,11 1,'1,1, )1( ασαααα βωω +++ +++ Ω=Λ−+      (5.10) 
 
Proof: Appendix C 
 
When the agent decides how much to consume each period, s/he compares the expected utility 
gain from saving with the current loss in utility that arises when s/he postpones consumption 
for further asset accumulation. The η  term gives expected utility next period times the 
weighted shadow price of next period’s assets (the term in the square bracket). Asset’s 
weighted shadow price itself yields the change in the objective function (expected utility) with 
respect to changes in the amount of assets held, taking into account both possible future states 
an agent could end up in – conditional on surviving. In particular η  represents the expected 
utility change from saving, considering the uncertainty of agent’s future state in the life cycle 
and taking into account agent’s desire to smooth consumption (as indicated by the appearance 
of the ρ term in the exponent).  
 
 77
The Euler equation states the relationship between current consumption and next period’s 
consumption. Desired consumption next period is a function of the interest rate R and the 
discount rate β. The Ω term augments the interest rate and reflects the impact of ageing and 
thus dying on consumption decisions. Since agent’s characteristics change as they grow older, 
additional units of money will be valued differently in the two possible future states (staying 
in group a or ageing to a+1). The Ω term captures this change as it can be expressed as a 
function of the transition probability ωa and the marginal rate of substitution between two age 
states a and a+129. It is easy to see that the term is always greater than one as long as ageing 
has a positive probability, and so the possibility of ageing leads to a higher weight on the 
interest rate.  
5.3.1.3 Impact of life-time uncertainty on individual’s behaviour 
Proposition 5.1: 
Let ∆ denote the inverse of agent’s marginal propensity to consume. Agent’s behaviour can be 
described by the following system of dynamic equations.  
(i) ( )a ta tata t HAC ,,, )1( ααα +∆=  
(ii) ( ) a tata t CV ,/1, αρα ∆=  
(iii) ( ) attataaat R 11111 +−++ ∆Ω+=∆ σβγ  
(iv) ( ) ρωω −++ Λ−+=Ω 111 )1( ataaat , ( ) ρ/11111 / atatat ++++ ∆∆=Λ     (5.11) 
(v) ( )111,, / +++ Ω+= tata taata t RHyH αα γ  
(vi) ( ) 1 1,'111,1, )1( + +−+++ Λ−+= a tataa taa t HHH αραα ωω  
Proof: see appendix C 
 
Equation (5.11)(i) states that an agent’s consumption at time period t equals the age-group 
specific marginal propensity to consume times the amount of assets held by the agent plus the 
present value of the agent’s total future labour income (her/his human wealth). Accordingly, 
as stated by (5.11)(v), the agent’s level of human wealth at time period t equals his/her current 
labour income y (which corresponds to pension income for the groups of retirees) plus the 
expected discounted level of his/her future human wealth ( H ). In equation (5.11)(v) the 
expected human wealth next period ( H ) is discounted at an interest rate that is augmented by 
                                                 
29 ( ) [ ]aaataaat MRS+=Λ−+=Ω −++ 1)1( 111 ωωω ρ ; Grafenhofer et. al. page 16. 
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the probability of death γa and the term Ωa. As previously explained, the augmentation of the 
interest rate by the Ω term reflects the effects of the possibility of ageing. Additionally the 
probability of surviving enters the discount factor. Not surprisingly agents take into account 
the possibility that they might not be alive next period and thus increase their discount rate on 
future labour income (just as in Gertler’s model). This means that agents value future labour 
income less the higher their probability of death. In total mortality leads to a higher discount 
factor on future labour income, reflecting the fact that – in the presence of life time 
uncertainty – future income is valued less than if one would live forever. This stands in 
perfect analogy to Gertler’s results. 
Analyzing equation (5.11)(iii) shows that the only source of changing propensities to consume 
is the rate of mortality 1-γa (Grafenhofer et al., page 18). If the survival rate were the same for 
all age-classes the marginal propensity to consume would be the same for all age-groups. 
Thus, a change in the propensity to consume from one age-group to the next reflects 
exclusively a change in mortality rates. This can be understood by considering equation 
(5.11)(iii). 
If mortality rates increase from one age-class to the next, both values Λ and Ω exceed one, 
implying that decreasing survivorship rates increase the marginal propensity to consume. An 
increase in Ω can be seen as an increase in the discount rate (as explained above). Thus, an 
increasing probability of dying increases the rate at which agents value their future income.  
As it becomes more probable to die, the marginal rate of substitution increases and the less 
willing agents are to postpone consumption leading to an increasing propensity to consume.   
5.3.2 Aggregate Consumption 
To derive aggregate variables one has to recall that some magnitudes depend on the individual 
life cycle (like human wealth) whereas other variables are solely determined by age-group 
characteristics (such as wage). As economic agents with the same life-cycle history are 
viewed as being identical, aggregation becomes quite easy. At date t an age-group a contains 
a number of a tN ,α  agents with the same life cycle history α. As these agents are assumed to be 
identical, they behave the same way, meaning that they show e.g. the same consumption 
behaviour. Thus, these a tN ,α  agents consume 
a
tC ,α  each. Simply aggregating over all age-
groups including all possible life cycle histories α leads to the aggregation formulas 
∑
Β∈
≡
a
t
a
t
a
t
a
t NCC
α
αα ,,  and ∑
=
≡
A
a
a
tt CC
1
.        (5.12) 
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Using the fact that the variables at∆ , atΩ  and atΛ  are the same for all agents within the same 
age-group (as they are determined by group affiliation) yields total age-group consumption as 
( )atatatat HAC +∆= )1( .         (5.13) 
As labour income is the same for all agents within the same age-group, the total age-group 
labour income simply follows as .at
a
t Ny  
Concerning economy wide labour patterns, one fact to be considered is the changing labour 
productivity between different age-classes.  
 
Remark 5.4: 
Denoting labour supply in efficiency units by sL and the number of retirees by RN  aggregate 
labour income at time t follows as 
( ) Rttsttt NpLwY +−= τ1   
where 
∑−
=
≡
1
1
Ra
a
a
t
a
t
s
t NL θ  and ∑≡ A
a
a
t
R
t
R
NN . 
 
For the aggregation of human wealth and assets one has to take into account the dependency 
on the individual life cycle and age-group affiliation. Very clearly assets are determined by 
the life cycle history of earnings as well as by current labour income and consumption 
behaviour which is entirely determined by age-group affiliation. Considering the aggregate 
expression of human wealth is simpler, as wage related income is solely determined by age-
group affiliation and thus is the same for all agents within the same age-class.  
 
Remark 5.5: 
Aggregate expressions for human capital follow as 
a
t
a
t
a
t NhH =  a tat Hh ,α≡  ( )
11
1
1
1
11 )1(
++
+
+
−
++
Ω
Λ−++=
t
a
t
a
t
a
t
aa
t
a
aa
t
a
t R
hhyh
ρωωγ   (5.14) 
Proof: see Appendix C 
 
The variable ath  denotes per capita human capital, thus the expression for total age-group 
human capital atH  is straightforward. As the last age-group does not face any transition 
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probability the expression for this group simplifies by setting Ω and ω equal to one. Turning 
to asset accumulation, aggregate equations follow as (see Appendix C) 
 
Remark 5.6: 
Aggregate assets evolve according to the three equations 
(i) 111
1
1 ttt SRA ω++ =   atatatat CYAS −+≡  
(ii) ( )[ ]1111 1 −−++ −+= ataatatat SSRA ωω        (5.15) 
(iii) [ ]ttttt CYARA −+= ++ 11  
Proof: see Appendix C 
 
Comparing the last equation with the equation for individual asset accumulation shows that 
the factor of redistribution cancels out, just as in Blanchard’s and Gertler’s models. Thus in 
the aggregate there is no net-effect from the existence of the insurance company, as this only 
redistributes from the dying to the living. 
5.4 Life cycle aspects of the model 
A special feature of the PA model is that it contains a number of intertemporal models as 
special cases. Choosing certain values for the parameters of the model replicates these 
models. Studying the different implications of these models can help to understand the impact 
of uncertainty in lifetime and earnings and how they are represented in the PA model.  
 
5.4.1 A synthesis of models 
Setting the parameters ωa = γa =1 yields a model of infinitely lived agents. As mortality and 
ageing are set to zero, age characteristics do not play any role. Marginal propensity to 
consume and human wealth are independent of age as can be seen by setting ωa = γa =1 in 
equations (5.11)(i)-(vi). The formula describing human wealth reduces to 
11 / +++= tttt RHyH . Compared to a model with positive mortality the discount rate on 
human capital is thus lower, reflecting the absence of life time uncertainty. The Euler 
equation of consumption then takes the form ( ) ttt CRC σβ 11 ++ = . Again the absence of life 
cycle aspects simplifies matters. Consumption decisions only depend on the relation between 
the preference factor β and the interest rate R.      
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Blanchard’s Perpetual Youth Model can be reproduced by setting γa =γ < 1 and ωa=1. This 
setting implies age independent consumption behaviour. Setting ωa=1 implies that Ωa is also 
equal to one. Using this in equation (5.11.iii) giving the inverse of the marginal propensity to 
consume together with the assumption of age-independent mortality shows the independency 
of consumption behaviour and age. Thus, the marginal propensity to consume is equal across 
agents, regardless of their individual time of birth. But compared to the case of infinitely lived 
agents the constant probability of death increases the propensity to consume. Human wealth is 
affected in the same way, as mortality increases the discount factor of future earnings 
(compare equation (5.11.v)). Uncertainty of life time thus results in higher consumption and 
less weight on potential future earnings though the age-independentness of mortality yields 
equal behaviour for all agents, regardless of their individual age. 
Gertler’s model of retirees and workers is replicated by defining two age-groups and setting 
the parameters to γ1 =1, γ2 < 1, ω1<1 and ω2=1. Thus, the first age-group faces no risk of 
dying but the risk of moving into the second stage of life (ω1<1), retirement. Death only 
occurs within the second age-group (among retirees). Gertler’s model generates heterogeneity 
between age-groups concerning consumption behaviour and human wealth and thus makes a 
good step towards proper representation of life cycle aspects.  
Finally, Diamond’s basic two period model can be reproduced by setting γ1 =1, γ2 =0, ω1=0 
ω2=1 and 2 1+ty =0. Thus, there is no life time uncertainty as people live for exactly two 
periods. In the second life period there is no income earned and agents only consume out of 
their wealth.     
 
5.4.2 Impact of uncertainties  
This comparison shows very well the impact of mortality and income risk on the economy. 
First, positive probabilities of death and changing life-stages imply changes in the marginal 
propensities to consume and an increase in the discount rate on future labour income. Second, 
as these probabilities vary between age-groups also the consumption behaviour varies 
between different stages of life. Also the discount rate on human capital changes due to 
different transition probabilities between age-groups.  
In general the PA Model implies similar impacts of ageing and dying as Gertler’s model. Just 
as in Gertler’s model and Blanchard’s Model of Perpetual Youth the marginal propensity to 
consume is an increasing function of the probability of death for each age-group, again 
reflecting realistic behaviour. The improvement that the PA model brings about lies in the 
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extension of Gertler’s model to more periods of life and to allow for young-age mortality. As 
shown in the next subsection the PA framework is therefore able to replicate life-cycle details 
at a high level. 
Aggregate consumption and savings depend strongly on the population dynamics (see 
equations 5.12, 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15). The distribution of wealth between age-groups 
determines economy wide consumption, due to altering propensities to consume with 
increasing age (as in Gertler’s model). Therefore the population structure has strong impacts 
on aggregate magnitudes and changes in mortality or transition rates will directly affect the 
economy as a whole. Thus, not only life cycle aspects are modelled realistically in the PA 
Model but also the impact of demographic changes on the economy can be studied well. 
Grafenhofer et al. conclude that the PA Model is a much more powerful tool of policy analysis 
as compared to the Perpetual Youth Model as well as the […] extension by Gertler (p 31). 
 
5.5 The PA model and real data 
How well is the PA model able to represent life cycle details? In order to answer this 
question, Grafenhofer et al. apply the model to real data on mortality rates and wage profiles. 
To attach real data to the PA framework one has to calculate the age-group specific 
characteristics such as labour productivity and survival rates from the data. Grafenhofer et. al. 
assume eight age-groups as shown in Table 1. The first life period thus starts with an age-
group corresponding to young adults “aged” 20 to 29, and so on. Table 1 also shows the age-
group characteristics for each age-class.  
 
Table 5.1 Demographic and Life-Cycle Parameters (Grafenhofer et al., page 10)  
Thus, age-group two has a 36% higher labour productivity than group one implying higher 
wage and so on, as can be seen in line 5. The last line shows the changing consumption 
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behaviour of agents as they move from one stage of life to the next. As can be seen, 
individual’s propensity to consume increases throughout their entire life time and becomes 
considerably high within the last two age-groups. The following figures show the PA model’s 
implications on life cycle earnings and survivorship compared to real data.  
 
Figure 5.1: Life cycle wages with different time intervals (Grafenhofer et al., page 12) 
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the higher the number of age-groups, the better life cycle 
earnings can be represented with the PA model. Choosing five-year intervals gives a very 
close approximation to the real data, but the ten year interval does very well too.  
 
Figure 5.2: simulated and actual mortality rates (Grafenhofer et al., page 13) 
Concerning the representation of mortality patterns the model gives a very detailed image of 
the increasing probability of death with increasing age. This approximation closely reflects 
real data and thus gives a quite realistic image of mortality.  
In total the PA model is able to capture life cycle details at a high level, as shown in Figure 
5.1 and 5.2. As Table 5.1 shows the PA model is able to reflect changing consumption 
behaviour with increasing age as well as changing wage related income. Thus, the PA model 
does well concerning the issues of demographic realism.  
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Appendix C 
 
Proof of Remark 5.1: 
This follows from the law of large numbers. Therefore each age-group is divided into three 
subgroups, according to the transition probabilities. Thus, the fraction 1-γ dies, while the 
fraction γ survives. From the surviving 1-ω age, while ω remain in the age-group. 
 
Proof of Remark 5.2: 
(i)  
This equation states, that the number of people in age-group a at time t+1 consists of those, 
who already where in age-group a at time t and survived to t+1 but did not age (the fraction 
ωγ of age-group a at time t). Additionally those who where in age-group a-1at time t and 
survived to t+1 but aged to age a enter the age-group at t+1 (a fraction of (1-ω)γ of age-group 
a-1). 
(ii) 
The youngest age-group consists at time t+1 of those who where in this age-group at time t, 
survived but did not age (a fraction of ωγ) and the number of new-borns 1 1),1( ++ ttN . 
(iii) 
Total population at time t+1 equals the number of people already alive at time t (Nt) plus the 
number of new-borns 1 1),1( ++ ttN  minus those of each group that did not survive from t to t+1 
(captured by the last term in the expression) 
 
Proof of Remark 5.3: 
It is again assumed, that the insurance company pays an actuarially fair group specific 
premium. Age-group a possesses a total amount of Sa savings at the end of period t. As a 
fraction of 1-γa dies from t to t+1 the insurance company collects a total amount of (1-γa)Sa 
savings and pays premiums, in total πaγaSa. Assuming zero profits for the insurance company, 
this yields a premium rate of πa=(1-γa)/γa or 1+πa=1/γa. Therefore the agent’s assets 
accumulate at ( )[ ]aata t SRA πα += ++ 111,  which is equivalent to  
[ ]a tata tta ta CyARA ,,11, αααγ −+= ++ .        (C.1)  
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Proof of Optimality Conditions: 
This proof is quite similar to the proof of the optimality conditions in Gertler’s model. The 
first order necessary conditions follow as the derivative of the value function with respect to 
consumption as 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) 0111 11/)1( =−+= +−−
43421
A
ttt
t
t RCV
dC
dV
γηγβρρρ
ρρρ       (C.2) 
where the last part (A) is the derivative of the value function next period with respect to At+1 
(as At+1 depends on Ct) 
This simplifies to the necessary condition in equation 5.8 
1
1
+
− = tt RC ηβρ            (C.3) 
where 
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1
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a
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t VdA
dV
dA
dV        (C.4) 
 
The second equation (equation 5.9) follows by defining  
( ) ( ) 11 −− =≡ ρρη atata
t
a
t CV
dA
dV          (C.5) 
 
The last equality is simply the derivation of the value function with respect to At after 
rearranging. Therefore the equation 
a
tt
a
t R 1,1, ++= αα ηβη           (C.6) 
holds. Notice that rearranging (C.5) results in  
( ) ρ−= 1// aaaa CVdAdV          (C.7) 
 
Defining the marginal rate of substitution between two age-states as 
( ) ρωωωω −
++
=
+ Λ−=−=≡ 1
11
0
1 1
/
/1|/ aa
a
aa
aa
a
a
Vd
aaa
dAdV
dAdVdAdAMRS     (C.8) 
 
where  
aa
aa
a
CV
CV
/
/ 11 ++≡Λ           (C.9) 
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comes from equation (C.7). 
Now define 
[ ] ( )( ) ρωωω −Λ−+=+≡Ω 111 aaaaaa MRS                  (C.10) 
 
Now take out ωa and ( ) ρ−= 1// aaaa CVdAdV  out of the equation (C.4) to obtain 
( )[ ] 1// −Ω= ρη aaaaa CVV                    (C.11) 
 
Rewriting expected utility as 
( )[ ]( )aaaaaaaa CVCCV /1 1+Λ−+= ωω                  (C.12) 
 
results by substitution in (C.11) as 
( )[ ] 111 −+Λ−+Ω= ρωωη aaaaaaa CC                   (C.13) 
 
using this and σ=1/(1-ρ)in equation (C.3) finally gives the Euler equation 
( ) a ta tta ta taa ta CRCC ,1,11 1,'1,1, )1( ασαααα βωω +++ +++ Ω=Λ−+                  (C.14) 
as stated in equation 5.10. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5.1 (taken from Grafenhofer et al.): 
Grafenhofer et al. show (Grafenhofer et al., page 34) that the consumption function fulfils the 
Euler equation and therefore is the optimal policy. First they insert 5.11(i) into the left hand 
term of (C.14) and use 1 1,'1,
+
++ = a ta t AA αα  and definitions 5.11(iv) and 5.11(vi) and get, 
[ ] ( ) a ttatata ta tat CRHA ,1111,1,1 / ασαα β ++++++ Ω=∆+Ω                  (C.15) 
 
Multiplying by 
( )111 / +++ Ω∆ tatata Rγ                     (C.16)  
 
and using 5.11(v) and equation (C.1) on the left hand side 
( ) a tatta taa ta ta t CRCHA ,111,,,, ασασααα βγ +−+ ∆Ω=−+                 (C.17) 
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substituting again 5.11(i) on the left side and cancel the C-terms yields a result corresponding 
to 5.11(iii). Hence the stated policy is optimal since it fulfils (C.14), a reformulation of the 
necessary conditions in Proposition 5.4. 
 
To proof the second equation (5.11(ii)) Grafenhofer et al. show that the indirect utility as 
stated in 5.11(ii) fulfils the Bellman equation (equation 5.4) indirectly (see Grafenhofer et al., 
page 35). Therefore insert 5.11(ii) into the Euler equation (C.14), multiply by ( ) ρ/11at+∆ , use 
the definition of at 1+Λ  and atV 1, +α . This gets  
( ) ( ) ρασα β /11,111, / atatattatat VRV ∆∆Ω= ++++                   (C.18) 
 
Taking to the power of ρ and multiplying by γaβ and using 5.11(iii) to substitute  
( ) 11111 −∆=∆Ω +−++ atattata R σβγ                    (C.19) 
 
The result is 
( ) ( )( ) atatatata VV ∆−∆=+ /1 ,1, ραραβγ                   (C.20) 
 
Remember that 5.11(ii) states that 
( ) a tata t CV ,/1, αρα ∆=                     (C.21) 
 
which is used on the right hand side. A minor rearrangement shows that the Bellmann 
equation (5.4) is fulfilled. 
 
Proof of Remark 5.5 (see Grafenhofer et al., page 20): 
Human capital is quite simple to asses as wage related income, and so per capita human 
wealth, is the same for all people within the same age-group. To show the validity of the 
proposition Grafenhofer et al. first take a look at the last age group denoted by A. All retirees 
of this age-group have the same present value of  future income, discounted at a common rate 
for all retirees (Grafenhofer et al., page 20). This gives, 
11,, / +++= tA tAAtA t RHyH αα γ                    (C.22) 
Writing the per capita value as 
A
t
A
t Hh ,α≡                      (C.23) 
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aggregate human capital follows simply as At
A
t
A
t NhH =  
The same holds for all other age-groups, which follows from 5.11(v) and 5.11(vi). 
 
Proof of Remark 5.5 (see Grafenhofer et al, page 35): 
Multiplying the equation (C.1) with a tN ,α  and sum over all biographies α yields 
∑
∈
++ =≡
a
tB
a
tt
a
t
aa
tt SRNAX
α
αα γ 1,1,   where atatatat CYAS −+≡                (C.24) 
multiplying by ωa 
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The first equality in (C.25) uses from 5.1(ii) 
aaa
t
a
t NN ωγαα *,1, =+                     (C.26) 
Then the N-term from (C.24) can be replaced when multiplying (C.24) with ωa. This 
represents the fact that only the fraction aaωγ  from the age-group survives without ageing 
and therefore remains part of the age-group.  
The second equality in (C.25) states that assets of age-group a at time t+1 consists of the 
assets held by members of the age-group who remain in a at time t+1, Xaω , plus the sum of 
inflowing assets of members belonging to age-group a-1 at time t who were hit by an ageing-
shock at time t. Notice that ageing is indicated by the term x(t+1), denoting the entry of the 
date of ageing to the biographies of aged agents.  
The last equality in (C.25) gives a closer look at the entry of newcomers. From equation 
5.1(iii) we know that the mass of newcomers is equal to 
)1(* 111,1´,
−−−
+ −= aaa ta t NN ωγαα                    (C.27)  
Since everyone in age-group a-1 has the same probability of moving to group a, the law of 
large numbers implies that an equal fraction out of each class of biographies α is moving into 
group a. This is expressed in the last sum-term. This sums over the entire set of possible 
histories (B), but takes only the common fraction of each biography group. Each of the 
movers possesses assets equal to a t
a
t AA 1,'
1
1, +
−
+ = αα . The last aggregation yields 
( ) 1111 1,1 1, /
1
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+
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−
+
−
+ =∑
−
a
t
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t
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t
a
t SRNA
a
t
γ
α
αα                   (C.28) 
by applying (C.24) to group a-1. Inserting this into the equation giving Xaω  yields 
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( )( ) 11111 /1 −−+−+ −−= atataaata SRAX γωγω                  (C.29) 
Recalling that 
a
ttt SRX 1+≡                      (C.30) 
gives finally equation (ii) from the Proposition as 
 
( )[ ]1111 1 −−++ −+= ataatatat SSRA ωω                   (C.31) 
 
Equation (i) simply follows from the fact that newborns do not possess any assets. 
Equation (iii) follows as the sum over all groups. 
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6. Interaction of age structure and fertility (Hock and Weil) 
Hock and Weil examine the interaction of the fertility rate and a population’s age structure. 
The fact that changes in fertility lead to changes in the age composition of a society is straight 
forward and well studied. In their analysis Hock and Weil go a step further by focusing on the 
feedback of the changing age structure of the population on fertility. The argument for this is 
that working age people in a society are confronted with a large number of dependents which 
they have to support through a system of social security. As the population grows older, the 
number of old age dependents grows relatively to the number of potential workers. This 
increase in old age dependency again is associated with higher costs for social security and 
thus lower consumption possibilities for the working. Confronted with increasing costs due to 
an increasing number of dependents, they argue, that agent’s decision of having children may 
be affected. Agents seek to keep the standard of living they have known from their parents 
and could thus decide to reduce the amount of children they wish to have. As a consequence 
these individual choices of reducing fertility can lead to an economy wide reduction in 
fertility. Seen this way, fertility is no longer an exogenously given parameter that changes due 
to shocks or factors outside the economy. It becomes an endogenous variable, which depends 
strongly on economic surroundings.  
Thus, the change in the age composition of the society is not only a result of changing fertility 
but fertility itself is affected by the population’s age structure via the channel of dependency. 
This in total works of course as a multiplier and leads to a highly dynamic problem.  
Hock and Weil develop a rather simple OLG model of an economy consisting of only three 
age groups, one representing the working live-stage and two stages of life, where agents are 
dependents – youth and retirement. The transition between these stages is modelled similar to 
Blanchard’s Perpetual Youth Model. Thus, agents of each age-group face a constant risk of 
changing their states. Based on three equations giving the laws of motion for each age-group, 
they define old-age and youth dependency ratios and analyse the consequences of changes in 
fertility and mortality under two scenarios. First, they assume fertility to be independent of the 
old age dependency ratio. Second, they assume fertility decisions to depend on the age 
structure of the population and thus being an endogenous variable.  
6.1 Basic model equations 
The age structure of the economy is defined by the triple (Ay, Am, Ao) where Ay refers to the 
stock of youths, Am to the number of working age people and Ao gives the number of retirees. 
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Following Blanchard’s approach of modelling mortality, the transition between different age 
states is assumed to be given by a constant probability for each age-group. These probabilities 
are denoted by λy, λm and λo respectively.  
 
Definition 6.1: 
The dynamics of the different age-groups are given by following equations:  
(i) ( ) ( ) ( )tAtNtA yYy λ−=&  
(ii) ( ) ( ) ( )tAtAtA MMyYM λλ −=&         (6.1) 
(iii) ( ) ( ) ( )tAtAtA OOMMO λλ −=& . 
 
N(t) here refers to the number of new-borns at time t. The laws of motion for the different age 
groups are simply the difference between inflow and outflow into each group, whereby the 
transition between these groups is modelled similar to models previously discussed. Hock and 
Weil simplify matters by assuming mortality to occur only among retirees. Thus, λo gives the 
probability of dying for retirees, whereas the other values λy and λm give the rate of transition 
for young and working people. Compared to the PA Model this simplification is a clear 
regress concerning demographic realism.  
 
Dependency ratios 
To analyse interdependencies between the age structure of an economy and its fertility rates 
Hock and Weil take a closer look at how changes in fertility and mortality affect economy 
wide dependencies. For this they first define  
 
Definition 6.2: 
Old age dependency ratio is defined as  
)(
)(
)(
tA
tA
to
M
O=            (6.2) 
Definition 6.3: 
Youth dependency ratio is defined as  
)(
)(
)(
tA
tA
ty
M
y= .          (6.3) 
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Total economic dependency is given by the needs-weighted sum of youth dependency and old 
age dependency (instead of simply summing up both ratios). The reason for introducing 
different weights on consumption needs is that these needs are assumed to differ across old 
and young people implying that changes in the two ratios do not affect the economy wide 
consumption possibilities the same way. Increasing old age dependency (relative to youth 
dependency) is likely to be associated with higher costs for social security compared to 
increasing youth dependency. This results from the fact, that elder are supported through 
social security at a higher level than youths. Thus, total dependency is given by 
)()()( totyte OY ρρ +=          (6.4) 
where the ρ terms indicate the different weights of dependency due to differing needs of older 
and younger agents. Further, Hock and Weil assume the economy’s output to be produced 
solely out of labour which yields total output as )()()( tAtWt M=Ω  where W(t) denotes wage 
at time t. Consumption of all age-groups is indexed to wages, thus cM(t)=ηW(t), cY=ρYcM(t) 
and cO=ρOcM(t). This yields the consumption index η to satisfy  
)(1
1)(
te
t +=η .         (6.5) 
under the aggregate resource constraint that total consumption must equal the total output of 
the economy30. This consumption index can also be interpreted as the support ratio (as 
discussed by Cutler et al. (1990)) and thus as the ratio between the production capacity of the 
economy and the consumption needs of the population (see Hock and Weil, page 11).  
 
Dynamics of the old age dependency ratio 
Using the motion laws previously defined in equation (6.1) yields  
Remark 6.1: 
The motion of the old age dependency ratio is given by 
( ) )()()()( totytoto YMOM λλλλ −−−=&        (6.6) 
with corresponding zero motion locus 
( ) ( ))()(|)( 0 tyZtyto OyMO
M
o ≡+−== λλλ
λ
&  .      (6.7) 
 
                                                 
30 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).ttAtctAtctAtc OOMMyY Ω=++  As output is produced solely by labour, it follows that 
( ) ( ) ( )tAtWt M=Ω  
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Thus, for a given level of the youth dependency ratio y there exists exactly one equilibrium 
level of old age dependency o (Hock and Weil, page 8). 
 
Dynamics of the youth dependency ratio 
Remark 6.2: 
The motion of the youth dependency ratio is given by 
( ) [ ]2)()()()( tytytnty YMY λλλφ −−−=&        (6.8) 
 
The motion of youth dependency ratio does not explicitly depend on the old age dependency 
ratio o(t). The expression φn(t) gives the flow of births per worker where n(t) is the average 
fertility rate per fertile and φ is the proportion of fertile workers. Under this setting changes in 
old age dependency do not directly affect y as the zero motion locus does not depend on the 
level of old age dependency. Thus, so far, there is no feedback effect from the age structure of 
the population on the fertility rate. The following section analyses the effects of changing 
fertility and old age mortality under the assumption of exogenous fertility.  
6.2 Exogenous fertility  
In the simple case of exogenous fertility the analysis of the dynamic system is 
straightforward. As the zero motion locus of the youth dependency ratio does not depend on 
the old age dependency ratio o(t) one can simply solve the motion equation (6.8) for y(t) - 
given a certain level of fertility.  
 
Remark 6.3: 
The equilibrium level of youth dependency is given by  
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Given this level of youth dependency one can use equation (6.7) to derive the corresponding 
equilibrium value of the old age dependency as 
 
Remark 6.4: 
The equilibrium level of old-age dependency is given by  
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( ) ( )yTTTTyZo YMOMo /1/
1)( +−== .      (6.10) 
 
Dynamic system with exogenous fertility 
Figure 6.1 shows the dynamic system for the case of exogenous fertility. As can be seen in the 
phase diagram the economy converges to the equilibrium point ( )oy,  which is globally 
stable. 
 
Figure 6.1. Dynamic System with exogenous fertility (Hock and Weil, page 12) 
In order to be able to analyze the consequences of changing fertility it is convenient to 
consider the flow of births per worker in terms of the gross reproductive rate (GRR), as Hock 
and Weil point out.  
 
Definition 6.5: 
Let G denote the gross reproductive rate and TM the expected time spent in the working age 
age-group. The flow of births per worker is denoted by 
MT
Gn =φ            (6.11) 
 
Further analysis will consider the effect of a decrease in the reproductive rate G in order to 
study the effect of declining fertility. Notice, that a value of G equal to one would imply 
replacement fertility (as Hock and Weil consider individuals and not e.g. females as 
reproductive units). Using the new definition of fertility yields the equilibrium level of youth 
dependency as 
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The effect of declining fertility with exogenous fertility 
A decrease in fertility can be seen as a decrease in the gross reproductive rate G. Inserting the 
new definition for the flow of births into the previous result for youth dependency shows, that 
a decrease in G reduces the equilibrium value of y (compare equation (6.12)). Figure 6.2 
shows the effect graphically. The decrease in y  shifts the y-locus to the left, leading in the 
long run to a decrease in the equilibrium level of the youth dependency ratio but to an 
increase in the level of old age dependency. As can also be seen in Figure 6.2, the decrease in 
G leads in the first place to an increase in the consumption index – i.e. the support ratio. This 
is due to the fact, that declining fertility reduces total economic dependency as fewer children 
are born. This effect is the so called demographic dividend. But as old age dependency 
increases through time – due to the reduced fertility rate less youths enter the workforce over 
time reducing total labour force in the long run– this demographic dividend effect declines. 
Thus, the reduction in total dependency through a drop in the fertility rate has only a 
temporary beneficial effect on the economy wide consumption possibilities. As time passes 
the increased old-age dependency ratio increases total dependency again and can even more 
than offset the former beneficial effect from reduced fertility. Figure 6.2 shows one possible 
outcome, where the economy ends up with a level of economic dependency higher than the 
initial one. 
 
Figure 6.2 One possible outcome from declining fertility (Hock and Weil, page 15) 
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Dependency minimizing fertility rate 
Whether an economy ends up with a higher total dependency rate after fertility has changed or 
not depends on how high the initial level of fertility has been. This is shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
Figure 6.3 Dependency Minimizing Fertility (Hock and Weil, page 16) 
Figure 6.3 illustrates how the initial level of fertility affects the outcome of decreasing 
fertility. The pair ( )mm oy ,  gives the level of o and y minimizing total economic dependency. 
As can be seen in the diagram, economies with initially high levels of fertility lie in Region A. 
For these economies a reduction in fertility is associated with a lower level of total 
dependency (the new equilibrium point lies on a lower iso-dependency line). For economies 
with initially high levels of fertility – lying in region B – a reduction in fertility leads to an 
increase in total dependency.  
 
Remark 6.5: 
At the dependency minimizing point ( )mm oy ,  the iso-dependency line has the same slope as 
the ZO locus implying that following equation holds: 
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There exists a unique level of G – denoted by Gm - that yields the dependency minimizing 
point ( )mm oy , . While an economy lying in Region A (with fertility exceeding Gm) can easily 
reduce fertility in order to maximize consumption and reduce total dependency, economies in 
Region B face difficulties in achieving optimal fertility. At the beginning of the transition to 
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higher fertility, the economy lying in Region B faces rising total dependency and thus a 
reduction in consumption possibilities. The transition is costly. Figure 6.4 illustrates the 
different situations for the two cases. 
 
Figure 6.4 Transition to Consumption-Maximizing Equilibrium (Hock and Weil, page 17)  
As the diagram shows, an increase in fertility for economies in Region B raises dependency in 
the economy and thus lowers the consumption index η. Only after some time has passed the 
rise in the youth dependency ratio starts to have beneficial effects and total dependency 
begins to fall as more workers enter the labour market, increasing the number of workers 
relative to total dependents. From then on the economy starts to profit from increased fertility. 
The case is much easier for the economy in Region A. Simply reducing fertility has an 
immediate beneficial effect on the consumption index via reduced youth dependency. Even 
though old age dependency raises total dependency is reduced leading to a more efficient 
positioning of the economy.  
 
Effect of declining old age mortality with exogenous fertility 
Besides reduced fertility rates, the second driving force leading to an ageing society is 
increasing life expectancy due to a reduction in old age mortality. In terms of the presented 
framework a reduction in old age mortality implies a shift in the ZO(y) locus upwards as 
illustrated in Figure 6.5. As explained before, the motion equation of the youth dependency 
ratio does not directly depend on the old age dependency ratio. And as long as there is no 
direct link from old age dependency to fertility modelled, this implies that the youth 
dependency locus remains unchanged.  
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Figure 6.5 Effects of a Decline in Old-Age Mortality with constant Fertility (Hock and Weil, page 20) 
As indicated by the diagram the rise in old age dependency shifts the economy to a higher iso-
dependency level. The consequence of increasing dependency is a reduction in consumption 
possibilities and thus a reduction in the consumption index. As shown in the box of Figure 6.5 
old age dependency begins to rise due to the decrease in mortality, reducing the consumption 
index.  
 
Impact of declining mortality on optimal fertility 
Considering optimality patterns for the economy, one has to notice that changing old age 
mortality also induces a change in the consumption-maximizing fertility rate Gm. An increase 
in the old age dependency ration o(t) leads, ceteris paribus, to a rise in Gm as this is an 
increasing function of retiree’s life expectancy (compare Hock and Weil, page 20).  
Why does decreasing mortality call for increasing optimal fertility? In the first place rising 
fertility would lead of course to an increase in youth dependency and therefore increase total 
economic dependency. But as old age dependency is more consumption intensive compared 
to y the future beneficial effect from higher fertility prevails. Thus, optimal fertility must rise 
in response to decreasing old age mortality. Higher fertility today implies a larger labour force 
in future leading to a reduction in old age dependency in the long run. The increase in fertility 
increases youth dependency y in equilibrium, as shown in Figure 6.6.  
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Figure 6.6. Effect of Decline in Old-Age Mortality on Consumption Maximizing Equilibrium 
(Hock and Weil, page 21) 
As illustrated in the diagram, the increase in the optimal level of fertility leads to a shift in the 
optimal y-locus to the right (indicated by ym). Depending on the current level of fertility this 
shift implies that the optimal rate of fertility moves either nearer to actual fertility rate or 
further away. Particularly for countries with high fertility (such as Gh in the diagram) the 
increase in ym moves the locus closer to actual level of youth dependency. This again implies 
that besides a decrease in the highest attainable consumption the potential gain from adjusted 
fertility is reduced (the scope for adjustment is reduced due to the increase in ym). For 
countries with lower levels of fertility (smaller than Gm) the opposite holds. The fact that the 
optimal level of fertility moves further away from current fertility increases the potential gain 
from fertility adjustment but again the highest attainable level of consumption is reduced. 
 
6.3 Endogenous fertility 
In this section fertility patterns are reconsidered. The previous sections assumed 
independency of fertility from old age dependency. Contrasting this perspective fertility is 
here seen to result from individual decision making. Thus, agents within an economy are 
assumed to decide themselves how many children to have. No longer can fertility then be 
viewed as an exogenously given factor, independent of economic surroundings. If people are 
able to make their own decisions concerning fertility it is very likely that prevailing 
dependencies influence these decisions. The thought is that working-age agents within an 
economy face a certain level of dependency. Obligated to finance the public pension system 
 100
workers have no choice in supporting the old and thus increasing old age dependency 
necessarily raises dependency costs. Thus, rising dependency implies increasing costs for 
those obligated to support dependents. Confronted with increasing old age dependency 
potential parents could therefore choose to adjust their fertility in order to reduce total 
dependency and this way increase their consumption possibilities. 
 
Asymmetric Costs and Tax Rate 
Hock and Weil set up a framework in order to analyse this interaction between prevailing 
dependency and the fertility rate. They assume workers to finance the public pension system 
as well as transfers to the young through taxes paid on labour income. One important aspect 
of their analysis is the asymmetric cost scheme between retirees and children. Retirees are 
supported entirely through the pension system, while children receive mainly privately 
financed support. Each retiree receives pension payments defined as a fraction β of after tax 
wages. Per capita transfers to youths is assumed as a fixed proportion π of the transfers to the 
elders, thus each child receives transfers as the fraction α=βπ of after tax income.  
 
Remark 6.6: 
The balanced-budget tax rate is given by  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )toty
totyt βα
βατ ++
+=
1
.          (6.14) 
 
This again implies that tax payments rise as youth dependency or old age-dependency ratios 
increase. But as payments to the young are only a fraction of pension payments, increases in 
both dependency ratios have quantitatively different effects. Increasing taxes again reduce 
transfer payments to elders and youths as they receive a certain proportion of after-tax 
income.  
 
Optimal Reproductive Rate with Endogenous Fertility 
One can again ask the question what the “optimal” level of fertility would be for workers to 
choose. As will become clear, the level of fertility chosen by agents privately would be, in 
general, very different from the “optimal” level a social planner would choose. Similar to the 
previous section dealing with exogenous fertility (compare equation (6.13)), there exists a tax-
rate minimizing gross reproductive rate mGτ  
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Optimal reproductive rate: 
The tax-rate minimizing gross reproductive rate mGτ  is given by the implicit solution to (Hock 
and Weil, page 24) 
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Agent’s private choice  
To capture the influence of the age structure on fertility decisions Hock and Weil set up a 
framework in which fertile workers include their utility from rearing children as well as the 
costs induced by having children into their maximization problem. After tax wage is split up 
between consumption and child rearing. In this quite simple model workers maximize their 
log utility function 
)(),(
max
tntc
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ]tntc lnln θ+         (6.17) 
subject to their budget constraint 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )twtntWtc =+ ξ         (6.18) 
The term ( )tWξ  in the budget constraint captures the “price of children” – thus the costs of 
child rearing31. 
 
Individual Optimum: 
Agents’ optimal private choice of fertility is given by 
( )
)()(1)(
)(~
totytW
twtn βα
ψψ ++==        (6.19) 
where ( )( )θξθψ += 1  and θ indicates the relative preference for children.  
 
Social planner’s choice 
Contrasting individual worker’s decision on fertility, a social planner would take into account 
the effects of fertility decisions on total dependency. As a consequence the optimal solution 
for fertility derived by the social planner will differ from worker’s private fertility choice. 
Planner’s optimality problem yields the objective function 
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Social Optimum: 
Social planner’s first order condition yields 
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The term )(
~ ∧
nn denotes the level of fertility that workers would choose given the values 
of ))(),((
∧∧
nony . Then the equilibrium equations (6.9) and (6.10) imply that the term in brackets 
on the right hand side of equation (6.21) satisfies 
( ) )(')()(')(' 2 ∧∧∧∧ ⎥⎥⎦
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⎡ −− nyTTnonony YMβαβα .    (6.22) 
The fertility rate chosen by a social planner )(
∧
n  is higher than agent’s private choice on 
fertility based on the age structure implied by 
∧
n  if the relation 
0)/()]([ 2 <−∧ αβ YM TTno         (6.23) 
holds and lower otherwise. Both levels of fertility are equal if (6.15) holds. Then 
∧
n  equals the 
tax minimizing rate of fertility mnτ . Thus, the social planner optimizing fertile workers’ 
equilibrium utility would set the fertility rate equal to that which minimizes the tax rate. It is 
important to notice, that decreasing old age mortality will lead to an increasing divergence 
between the private choice and the social planner’s optimum, which minimizes the tax-rate 
(see Hock and Weil, p 27). Thus the optimal response to decreasing mortality differs from the 
desired response of individuals.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
31 Assuming constant wage growth equal to g and denoting childrens’ consumption needs by χ it follows that ( )YY gTT −= 1/χξ . 
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The effect of a decline in old age mortality with endogenous fertility 
Through the channel of taxes the age structure of the population now affects fertility 
decisions. As old age dependency rises due to decreasing old age mortality, taxes rise due to 
higher costs for social security. This income effect affects fertility decisions. Necessarily the 
y-locus has now another shape than in previous analysis in section 6.2 because the old age 
dependency now affects the y-locus. By including the flow of births per worker n~  into the 
framework the locus takes the form 
)()1(
)/1(
1| 20 yZyyyTT
To y
MY
Y
y ≡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−== α
φψ
β& .     (6.24) 
As shown in Figure 6.7 the locus is no longer a vertical line but downward slopping and 
convex. There is one single crossing point of the two loci which implies that the equilibrium 
is globally stable.  
 
Figure 6.7 Global Dynamics with Endogenous Fertility (Hock and Weil, page 28)  
 
Figure 6.8 Effects of Decline in Old-Age Mortality with Endogenous Fertility (Hock and Weil, page 28) 
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As old age mortality decreases the Zo locus shifts upwards, representing increasing old age 
dependency due to increased life expectancy. If fertility were exogenous as in the previous 
analysis in section 6.2 the new level of old age dependency would increase to o’. 
Independency of fertility decisions and old age dependency would imply that there would be 
no shift in the youth dependency locus. But things are very different now, as fertility decisions 
are affected by the age structure of the population. As increasing old age dependency drives 
up the tax rate workers’ disposable income is reduced – this is the income effect previously 
mentioned. This induces fertile workers to adjust their fertility rate. Decreasing fertility again 
leads to increasing old age dependency as shown in a previous section. Thus, there is a 
multiplier effect leading to further increase in old age dependency. The economy in Figure 6.8 
thus converges to a higher level of old age dependency. 
6.4 Life cycle aspects of the model 
Hock and Weil analyze the impact of changing mortality and fertility on the economy. 
Concerning individual’s life cycle the framework generates uncertainties as the transition 
between different life stages is modelled in a probabilistic fashion. But, compared to the PA 
model, this framework assumes mortality to occur only among retirees. This is a clear 
drawback concerning demographic realism.  
In general the analysis of the interaction of fertility, population’s age structure and economic 
outcomes is interesting from a demographic point of view. Reduced fertility leads to a 
reduction of the future labour force which again implies an increase in old age dependency. 
Increasing life expectancy due to a reduction in old age mortality also increases old age 
dependency. Thus, the model yields the dynamics one would expect. Taking into account the 
feedback effect from the population’s age structure on fertility, leads to an even greater effect 
of declining old age mortality on old age dependency. This is due to a multiplier effect 
induced by the agents’ reaction on increased old age dependency again reflecting quite 
realistic behaviour. 
But the framework itself rests on very simplifying assumptions, e.g. assuming that there exists 
no capital in the economy. Thus, this analysis only shows the “pure” dynamics of changing 
fertility and mortality, which can in reality be superposed by other effects. For example 
reduced fertility could be associated with increasing female labour force participation. This 
model does not allow for such effects.  
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Appendix D 
 
Proof of Remark 6.1: 
Combining equations 6.1(ii) and 6.1(iii) and using definitions 6.2 and 6.3 yields the motion 
equation 
( ) )()()()( totytoto YMOM λλλλ −−−=&  
 
The zero-motion equation follows by simply setting the motion equation to zero and 
rearranging. 
 
Proof of Remark 6.2: 
Combining equations 6.1(i) and 6.1(ii) and using definitions 6.2 and 6.3 yields the motion 
equation 
( ) [ ]2)()()()( tytytnty YMY λλλφ −−−=&  
 
Proof of Remark 6.3: 
Equation 6.9 follows by setting  
( ) [ ]2)()()()( tytytnty YMY λλλφ −−−=&  
 
equal to zero and solving for y. Denoting Tj as the inverse of λj finally gives the expression 
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Proof of Remark 6.4: 
Follows by simply exchanging Tj for λj. 
 
Proof of Remark 6.6: 
Aggregate resource equation is given by 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )tAtWtttWAttWtAttWA MOMY )(111 =Ω=−+−+− τβττα  
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Dividing by AM and using the definitions for the old-age dependency ratio and the youth 
dependency ratio it follows that 
( )( ) ( ) ( )tWtWoy =−++ τβα 11  
 
Rearranging gives 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )toty
totyt βα
βατ ++
+=
1
 
 
Proof of Individual Optimum: 
Inserting the budget constraint 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )twtntWtc =+ ξ  
 
into the objective function 
)(),(
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gives the first order condition as 
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solving for n gives 
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Defining ( )( )θξθψ += 1  and using the result from Proposition 6.5? gives finally 
( )ψβα oyn ++= 1
1 . 
 
Proof of Social Optimum: 
Inserting the budget constraint again into the objective function yields 
[ ] ( )nWnw lnln θξ +−  
 
which can be rewritten as 
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the first order condition follows as 
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the first order condition can be written as  
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where n~ refers to workers decision on fertility. 
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7. Conclusion 
To conclude I will first briefly summarize the models presented in my thesis and highlight the 
main findings. I will also present a final comparison and discussion of the differences between 
the models concerning their degree of demographic realism and their ability of representing 
life cycle details.  
7.1 Summary of findings 
This thesis presented and compared different approaches of achieving a higher degree of 
demographic realism in Models of Overlapping Generations. The main difference between the 
models presented in this work lay within the modelling of mortality patterns, with the last 
section dealing with some fertility aspects too. First models with a quite unrealistic view on 
mortality as being independent of age were presented. The next section moved to age-
dependent mortality patterns followed by the alternative view on ageing in the PA Model and 
finally a discussion of the interaction of fertility and the populations’ age-structure.  
 
Within the age-independent mortality approaches the models discussed covered the simple but 
also very fundamental model by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965), Blanchard’s (1989) 
Perpetual Youth Model and Gertler’s (1999) extension of Blanchard’s Model to a two life-
stage model with retirees and workers. As a starting point of the analysis the Diamond Model 
showed surely not the highest degree of demographic realism, assuming only two stages of 
life and perfect survivorship between those two life-stages. One could say that this certainly 
did not reflect real-life demographics very well. Nevertheless the framework allowed for 
different propensities to consume in the two different stages of life which is an important 
feature of the human economic life-cycle. Furthermore it reflected a very important aspect of 
the human economic life cycle, namely the existence of different „stages“ of life, working live 
and retirement. 
Using the Diamond model as a benchmark, the improvement achieved by Blanchard’s 
Perpetual Youth Model certainly lay within the introduction of individual life-time 
uncertainty. Even though the assumption of a constant, and therefore age-independent, 
mortality rate seemed not to really improve demographic realism to a very high degree, it still 
showed two very important and realistic impacts of the presence of a life-cycle under life-time 
uncertainty. 
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First, the economy’s capital stock was a decreasing function of the probability of death (see 
Proposition 3.10). Second, retirement caused the capital stock to increase, reflecting the effect 
of retirement on saving decisions (see Proposition 3.11). Therefore increasing mortality 
caused capital accumulation to decrease, meaning that the higher the probability of death, the 
less people tended to save. The more severe retirement affected income negatively on the 
other hand (represented by a high value of α in Definition 3.1) the more people saved. Thus, 
these dynamics reflected quite realistic dynamics. The drawback of Blanchard’s model was 
that the assumption of a constant mortality rate implied not only age-independentness of 
mortality, but also of future life expectancy and consumption behaviour.  
 
Gertler created a model of retirees and workers which was able to combine the benefits of 
both models, by developing a model capturing both, individual life-time uncertainty and 
altering consumption behaviour with age. Though again consumption behaviour within each 
life stage (work or retirement) resulted to be independent of agents’ literal age (meaning the 
time that has passed since his/her birth) but not independent of the agents’ state in the life 
cycle. Otherwise effects similar to those already found for Blanchard’s model could be 
observed concerning the impact of life-time uncertainty on retirees’ consumption behaviour 
(notice that mortality was only assumed for retirees). Again it turned out that the propensity to 
consume was an increasing function of the probability of death (see equation 3.25). 
Considering workers, the effect of “life-stage uncertainty” was to increase the discount rate on 
his/her human capital. The lower the probability of remaining part of the workforce was, the 
lower potential future labour income was valued by the agent. Viewing the Gertler economy 
in its aggregate showed that the dynamics influencing capital accumulation were quite similar 
to the Blanchard economy. Again the higher the probability of death (or retirement) was, the 
lower was the resulting capital stock (see Section 3.3.2.1). Capital accumulation itself also 
depended on the retirees’ share of total assets. This simply reflected the fact, that retirees had 
a different propensity to consume due to their risk of death. Concerning total human wealth in 
the economy, it was shown, that the presence of life-time uncertainty led to a reduction of 
human wealth via an increased discount rate (see equation 3.41 (iii)). Thus Gertler’s model 
achieved a high degree of demographic realism combining the advantages of Diamond’s 
Model (different consumption behaviour in different stages of life) with a life-time 
uncertainty pattern.  
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Li and Tuljapurkar achieved an even higher degree of demographic realism by breaking up 
the restrictive assumption of age-independent mortality. In their framework they could take 
account of changing life expectancy and life-time uncertainty on agents’ behaviour directly by 
incorporating a distribution function of a random variable called “death-age” into Blanchard’s 
framework. As Li and Tuljaprukar stated, this approach naturally allows us to think about 
individual decision making in response to life extension […] and changes in the uncertainty of 
the timing of death […] (Li and Tuljapurkar, p.2). These changes in life expectancy and life 
time uncertainty were represented by changes in the average death-age (mean of the 
distribution) and changes in the variance of death-age (variance of the distribution). 
Assuming first constant human capital (see Assumption 4.1) they found, that the pure effect 
of increasing life expectancy (thus, leaving the death-age variance unchanged) was to increase 
total wealth, consumption and wages while decreasing the interest rate in the economy. The 
pure effect of decreasing death-age variance on the other hand was to decrease wealth, 
consumption and wages while increasing the interest rate. Thus, as the death-age variance is 
likely to be decreasing over time an age-independent mortality approach (implying that the 
variance of death-age moves in the same direction as life-expectancy (see Remark 4.2)) 
underestimates the effect of increasing life expectancy on the interest rate while leading to 
overestimated magnitudes for wealth, consumption and wages (see section 4.2.4). In 
comparing the implications of their model with a fixed death-age scenario and a constant 
mortality scenario, they found a much better fit to real data when assuming death-age to be 
normally distributed (see section 4.2.4).  
A more sophisticated analysis followed by letting the changing life-time horizon affect 
agents’ decision of investing in their human capital (increasing the years of schooling 
increases future wages; see Definition 4.3) and by introducing retirement. Doing so, they 
achieved an even higher degree of demographic realism. These extensions affected human 
capital available to the economy directly and indirectly, by reducing the size of the workforce 
on the one hand and by improving the productivity of workers on the other hand. Thus, in 
contrast to the simpler setting, human capital was not assumed to be constant anymore, 
improving the framework’s realism. 
This impact of increasing life expectancy on individually chosen schooling tenure again 
reflects realistic behaviour, as people - confronted with increasing life-expectancy and lower 
life-time uncertainty - are likely to increase years of schooling in order to gain higher wages 
in future. This only makes sense, if income earned in future is valued relatively high, which 
again is more likely to be the case, the lower the probability of death (as already seen in 
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Blanchard’s model, an increasing probability of death increases the discount rate on future 
human capital).  
 
The effect of the introduction of schooling to their framework was most apparent when 
viewing the behaviour of the interest rate (see section 4.3.1.2). In contrast to the results 
obtained in the simpler case with constant human capital, the interest rate did not decrease 
monotonically as life expectancy increased, but increased for some time before decreasing 
with high life-expectation. This led again to strong impacts on other economic variables (Li 
and Tuljapurkar, page 25). On the other hand retirement worked as a reduction in available 
human capital (see Equation 4.5). While decreasing retirement age decreased the interest rate, 
total wealth, total consumption and total labour (human capital), it increased wages. Li and 
Tuljapurkar concluded that the implementation of an age-dependent mortality had strong and 
significant impacts on resulting economic magnitudes (Li and Tuljapurkar, page 25) and 
should therefore be taken into account in economic analysis.  
 
The Probabilistic Aging Model allowed for a very high degree of heterogeneity among agents. 
In distinguishing between time passing and ageing as a process altering peoples’ life cycle 
characteristics Grafenhofer et al. gave a very realistic image of differences between people 
within an economy. This approach allowed for ageing at different speed, which reflected the 
fact that people in real life seem not to age synchronically (some individuals experience 
illness or accidents affecting their health which in turn affects their mortality risk and labour 
productivity). Here, the individual life cycle history determined an agent’s economically 
relevant characteristics, such as earnings potential and labour productivity. The consequence 
was that agents profoundly differed from each other which yielded a high degree of 
demographic realism and life cycle detail. Compared to Gertler’s model Grafenhofer et al. 
allowed not only for life-stage uncertainty but also for mortality in younger age-stages. 
Taking a look at the model’s implications of life-time uncertainty showed that the resulting 
dynamics were similar to those already obtained by Gertler. Not surprisingly, as the PA 
Model is an extension of Gertler’s framework. Thus, the same implications hold. First, 
different age-groups had different propensities to consume which were again equal for all 
agents within the same age-group. The group-specific propensities to consume again 
depended negatively on the group’s mortality risk. So the extension to more age-groups 
yielded more diversity between agents but still implied equality of consumption behaviour 
within each group. 
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Second, the discount rate on future labour income depended negatively on the group-specific 
mortality risk and a term that was positively correlated with the risk of ageing (or changing 
states in the life cycle). This again reflected the fact, that future labour income was valued 
more the higher the probability of remaining part of the labour force and the higher the 
probability of surviving was.  
Also, as in Gertler’s model, the distribution of wealth mattered again. As age-groups differed 
in consumption behaviour, the population structure had strong impacts on economic 
magnitudes. As the group-specific consumption behaviour was strongly influenced by the 
mortality and transition probabilities, demographic changes resulted in aggregate changes. 
Thus, the PA Model allowed for demographic changes to alter the economic surrounding.  
As the PA model is an extension of Gertler’s model it was not surprising to find similar 
implications of the presence of life time and life stage uncertainties. The difference was that 
the PA model offered a richer and more detailed framework, allowing for mortality in early 
life stages and dealing with a higher number of life stages. In total the PA model was 
therefore able to represent life cycle details to a higher degree and thus gave a very high 
degree of demographic realism.   
 
The last section of the thesis presented a framework by Hock and Weil, paying particular 
attention to the potential feedback effect of the age-structure of a population on its fertility 
rates. The reasoning behind the assumption of a feedback effect was that working-age people 
are usually obliged to finance a social security system by paying taxes. As the population 
aged, the old-age dependency ratio increased, leading to an increase in total costs for social 
security. Facing this increase in costs, Hock and Weil argued, that people could decide to 
reduce their own fertility in order to reduce total dependency costs (the taxes they were due to 
pay plus the costs involved in child-rearing). Therefore the age structure of a population was 
likely to affect peoples’ private choice on fertility.  
 
To study this interaction between fertility and the age-structure of a population Hock and 
Weil set up a rather simple OLG model, consisting of only three age-groups. In the first part 
of their study they assumed fertility to be exogenously given, and thus independent of the age 
structure. Results showed, that in the short run a decline in fertility lead to an initial decline in 
total dependency due to a reduction in the youth dependency ratio, but resulted in an 
increased old-age dependency ratio in the long run (see 6.2.2). The cause of this increased 
old-age dependency was that the reduction in fertility led to smaller cohorts entering the 
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labour force over time, reducing the ratio of working-age people to old-age dependents (see 
6.2.2). Depending on the initial level of fertility the increase in old-age dependency could 
even more than offset the initial benefit from reduced youth-dependency resulting in an 
increase in total dependency (see 6.2.2.1). Decreasing old-age mortality was found to directly 
result in an increase in total dependency (see 6.2.3). 
Endogenizing fertility lead to the interesting result, that decreasing old-age mortality led to an 
increasing divergence between the optimal fertility rate (social planner’s choice minimized 
the tax rate) and agents’ desired fertility rate (see 6.3.2.2). This divergence was due to fact 
that decreasing mortality increased the level of tax-minimizing fertility, thus increased the 
optimal response-level of fertility. As decreasing old-age mortality came along with 
increasing taxes in order to finance the social security system, agents’ reaction was likely to 
be exactly the opposite, namely to reduce fertility in order to reduce their own dependency 
related costs (see 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2). The consequence of this divergence was a multiplier 
effect, leading to an even stronger impact of reduced old-age mortality on old-age 
dependency. 
Thus, the model by Hock and Weil showed interesting dynamics and certainly covered an 
issue so far not studied in this thesis. But on the other hand the framework rested on very 
simplifying assumptions, e.g. absence of capital. Looking at the life-cycle patterns of the 
model, one has to admit that the simplifying assumptions on mortality (which occurred only 
in the third age-group) and transition rates (again constant for each member of the same age-
group) did not yield any improvement concerning life cycle realism. This analysis only 
showed the “pure” dynamics of changing fertility and mortality, which can in reality be 
superposed by other effects such as increasing female labour participation. Therefore one had 
to be careful in drawing too strong conclusions form the framework’s implications.      
 
To summarize, the attempts of improving demographic realism of the presented models were 
mainly based on different mortality assumptions. First, Blanchard created individual life time 
uncertainty assuming a constant risk of death. This approach was improved by Gertler, 
extending the model to two life stages and therefore combining the advantages of the 
Diamond model with Blanchard’s life time uncertainty aspect. Grafenhofer et al. finally 
extended the model to more stages of life and by introducing life time uncertainty among all 
age-groups. All these models assumed constant transition rates between life stages (in case of 
Blanchard the transition was directly to death) implying constant consumption behaviour 
within each life-stage. 
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A different approach was the incorporation of a probability distribution of death into 
Blanchard’s framework by Li and Tuljarurkar. Doing so Li and Tuljapurkar created the only 
really age-dependent mortality framework presented in this thesis (Grafenhofer et al. and 
Gertler create life-stage dependent mortality). 
The main impacts of the introduction of life time uncertainty were mainly to affect capital 
accumulation, the discount rate on human capital (future labour income) and consumption 
behaviour. Mortality worked as a decreasing force on capital accumulation while the 
introduction of retirement opposed this dynamic. Life time uncertainty further worked to 
increase the discount rate on future labour income and on the propensity to consume. 
 
7.2 Concluding remarks 
The structure of the thesis was meant to show a tendency of increasing realism concerning 
demographics and the representation of life cycle details. What became clear was that a 
distinct ranking of the models concerning their degree of demographic realism and quality in 
representing life cycle details was only possible to a limited extent. Within the age-
independent mortality approaches the path from the Diamond model to the Perpetual Youth 
Model and finally to Gertler’s model of two life stages, showed a quite clear path of 
increasing realism, first by Blanchard’s introduction of individual life-time uncertainty and 
then by Gertler’s distinction between retirees and workers - creating heterogeneity in agents’ 
consumption behaviour. The PA model can be seen as an extension of Gertler’s model to 
more life stages and introducing mortality for younger age-groups. Therefore it yielded a 
higher degree of demographic realism and life cycle details, as compared to the age-
independent mortality frameworks of Diamond, Blanchard and Gertler. Their framework can 
be seen as creating a “life-stage dependentness” of mortality.  
 
Clearly, also Li and Tuljapurkar’s age-dependent mortality framework improved Blanchard’s 
approach of modelling life-time uncertainty as a constant probability of death, but it is hard to 
state whether it did this to a higher degree than the PA model or not. Both models created an 
age-related difference in mortality risk between agents, whereby Li and Tuljapurkar assumed 
a distribution function of death-age (thus creating age-dependent mortality) while Grafenhofer 
et al. defined different mortality risks for different age-groups (creating life-stage dependent 
mortality). As both models were able to replicate real mortality patterns well and as a ranking 
of the models is not necessary one can simply state that both offered a clearly more realistic 
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image of mortality than the age-independent frameworks. So the structure of my thesis still 
gives the tendency of increasing realism, even though I do not claim one of the two models 
(PA Model or Li and Tuljapurkars model) to be more realistic than the other. 
 
The exception of this tendency of increasing realism is the last section dealing with the 
interaction of fertility and the population’s age-structure. This model simply deals with 
another aspect of demographics and therefore enriches the thesis as a whole but does not offer 
a better representation of life cycle aspects or mortality than the models discussed in section 5 
and 6. Nevertheless it has its eligibility among the other models in this thesis, as it examines 
the dynamics underlying demographic changes (the change in the age-composition on 
fertility).    
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Abstract  
This thesis deals with the issue of realistic demographic structures in Models of Overlapping 
Generations (OLG). Basic OLG models are often built on very restrictive demographic 
assumptions and are not able to represent realistic human economic life-cycle details to a high 
degree. Facing changing population age structures in most industrialized countries, the issue 
of proper demographic analysis becomes very important. Leaving these changes aside 
economic analysis can lead to false or imprecise conclusions. Therefore attention should be 
paid to realistic representation of demographics and life cycle details in models used for 
economic analysis (Bommier and Lee, page 138). 
In this thesis I present and compare different OLG frameworks focusing on their 
representation of demographics and life cycle details. Starting with the basic OLG model 
developed by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) I show different approaches of 
modelling realistic mortality patterns. The first step towards more realism in OLG models is 
the introduction of individual life time uncertainty by Blanchard (1989) and Yaari (1965) 
assuming a constant risk of death throughout life. Blanchard’s somewhat unsatisfying result 
of age-independent life-expectancy and consumption behaviour is improved by Gertler (1999) 
combining individual life time uncertainty with the introduction of two different life-stages. In 
their Probabilistic Aging model (PA Model) Grafenhofer et al. (2006) further improve 
Gertler’s framework to a higher number of life stages and therefore generating a higher 
degree of heterogeneity among people within the economy. Li and Tuljapurkar (2004) 
develop an age-dependent mortality approach by incorporating a probability distribution of 
age at death to Blanchard’s framework and are so able to let changing life expectancy and 
changing life time uncertainty affect individuals’ behaviour. Finally Hock and Weil (2006) 
analyze the interaction of fertility and the population age-structure using a very simple OLG 
model with probabilistic transition between different life stages. I show that the main 
consequences of introducing life time uncertainty are to affect capital accumulation, 
consumption behaviour and the discount rate on future labour income. Capital accumulation is 
affected negatively by increasing risk of death while retirement opposes this dynamic by 
increasing capital accumulation. Consumption behaviour is affected by increasing the 
marginal propensity to consume while an increasing probability of death increases the 
discount rate on future labour income.  
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Abstract (Deutsch) 
Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Implementierung realistischer Demographie in 
Modellen überlappender Generationen (OLG-Modelle). Einfache OLG-Modelle basieren oft 
auf sehr restriktiven Annahmen bezüglich ihrer demographischen Struktur und können daher 
keine hinreichend realistischen Lebenszyklen abbilden. Angesichts der Veränderungen in der 
Altersstruktur der Bevölkerung industrialisierter Länder gewinnt die Berücksichtigung 
demographischer Analysen an Bedeutung. Lässt man diese Veränderungen außer Acht, kann 
eine ökonomische Analyse zu falschen bzw. unpräzisen Schlussfolgerungen führen. 
Deswegen sollten demographischer Realismus und detaillierte Lebenszyklen in Modellen 
berücksichtigt werden, die zur ökonomischen Analyse verwendet werden (Bommier und Lee, 
Seite 138). 
In dieser Diplomarbeit präsentiere und vergleiche ich verschieden OLG-Modelle im Hinblick 
auf deren Fähigkeit, realistische Demographie und Lebenszyklen abzubilden. Am Anfang 
steht dabei das einfache OLG Modell von Samuelson (1958) und Diamond (1965). Davon 
ausgehend präsentiere ich verschiedene Ansätze realistischere Demographie zu modellieren. 
Der erste Schritt zu mehr Realismus ist die Implementierung individueller Lebensunsicherheit 
im Modell von Blanchard (1989) und Yaari (1965), in dem eine konstante 
Sterbewahrscheinlichkeit angenommen wird. Die wenig zufrieden stellenden Ergebnisse einer 
altersunabhängigen Lebenserwartung und Konsumneigung werden im Modell von Gertler 
(1999) verbessert, in dem individuelle Lebensunsicherheit mit der Modellierung zweier 
Lebensabschnitte kombiniert wird. In ihrem Probabilistic Aging Modell (PA-Modell) 
verbessern Grafenhofer et al. (2006) Gertlers Modell, indem sie weitere Lebensabschnitte 
einführen und damit den Grad an Diversität zwischen den Menschen der Ökonomie erhöhen. 
Li und Tuljapurkar (2004) entwickeln ein Modell mit altersabhängigem Sterberisiko, indem 
sie die Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung des „Sterbealters“ in Blanchards Modell 
implementieren. Dadurch können sich Veränderungen in Lebenserwartung und 
Überlebensunsicherheit auf das Verhalten der Individuen auswirken. Schließlich analysieren 
Hock und Weil (2006) die Wechselwirkung zwischen Fertilität und der Altersstruktur der 
Bevölkerung in einem einfachen OLG Modell, in dem der Übergang zwischen den 
Lebensabschnitten analog zum PA-Modell modelliert ist. Ich zeige, dass sich die Einführung 
von Lebensunsicherheit auf Kapitalakkumulation, Konsumverhalten und die 
Diskontierungsrate auf zukünftiges Arbeitseinkommen auswirken. Während höheres 
Sterberisiko mit geringerer Kapitalakkumulation verbunden ist, führt Pensionierung zu einem 
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Kapitalanstieg. Die Konsumneigung steigt mit höherer Sterbewahrscheinlichkeit, während 
zukünftiges Arbeitseinkommen höher abdiskontiert wird. 
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